“Can the Islamic State Survive? What Can the US Do?” by Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen

Syria Comment - 수, 2014-07-23 01:58

“Can the Islamic State Survive? What Can the US Do?”
by Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen –
July 22, 2014

Islamic state: a lion and a fox?

The Islamic State (formerly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham) emerged out of the ashes of two conflicts. It was born as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then used the power vacuum created by the civil war in Syria to create a base out of which it could create the foundations for an emerging state. However, how likely are they to succeed in their goal of establishing a functioning state? In answering this question, it is crucial to understand their strategy: do they only operate based on ideological fervor, or does their strategy contain elements of realism? Machiavelli taught us that a successful prince should learn to be both a fox and a lion, does IS have the ability to act as both?

Machiavelli’s recommendations for Princes

The lion cannot protect himself from traps, and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must therefore be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten wolves. Machiavelli, The Prince.

What did Machiavelli mean in his masterpiece, which for long has been essential reading on the reading list for all first year political science students? In the animal kingdom, a lion is the symbol of ultimate strength. It is the most powerful mammal on land that is feared by all other animals. However, the lion has a weakness, it is not intelligent enough to recognize the danger of traps.

A fox is also a predator, living off preying on other animals. However, the fox is cunning and calculating. It recognizes dangers when it feels uncomfortable in a new setting. A fox does not necessarily attack if it judges that it could result in it being in danger.

A temporary alliance of convenience

Evidence from the ground in Syria shows that there is a common understanding between the Assad regime and IS that their inaction towards each other is of mutual benefit. There is enough proof for one to state that Assad is not targeting the areas controlled by ISIS, but chooses to hit more moderate opposition held areas instead. The immediate enemy of Assad and IS are the same, as Frederic C. Hof puts it “Whatever Bashar al-Assad and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi may think of one another personally, their top tactical priority in Syria is identical: destroy the Syrian nationalist opposition to the Assad regime.“

In the meantime, the Islamic State is pushing further and further into the areas held by the anti-Assad. IS has shown itself to be a shrewd opportunist. It has developed a strategy of reaping the ripe fruits sown by other militant groups. They largely go into areas already weakened by fighting between the SA and the various groups making up the more moderate opposition. Currently in Aleppo, the Syrian Army is trying to use its most effective strategy: set up a siege around the areas held by the opposition, and starve them both materially and physically. In the meantime, IS is operating closer and closer to the suburbs of the city and the opposition fears that the two forces together might eventually lead to complete control by IS and the Syrian army.

What explains this mutual understanding? Assad’s calculation is that he is likely to win more easily against IS if he emerges as the victor against the more nationalistic opposition within the country. In many ways, he has paved the way for the more radical elements of the opposition to become empowered. In his view, IS would be an easier enemy to defeat, and the further they expand their control, the more likely it becomes that the west supports Assad. (Also read this in the NYTimes, and this in the Guardian.)

Undoubtedly, this unholy alliance is a temporary one. In the long term, if we see the more nationalist elements even further weakened, we are likely to see a permanent war between IS and the Syrian army. This week we saw evidence of this, when IS attacked and beat the Syrian Army in the most significant battle yet, leading to IS taking control of one of the most important gas production facility. This points to IS being able to operate with an understanding of realism. It acts like a fox when needed, and a lion when conditions allow for it. It has formed a quasi alliance with Assad, and this might be one its most important strategical assets, largely overlooked by observers.

IS the Lion

Overwhelmingly, IS has used brute force towards anyone who acts against it. Late last year the brutality, combined with IS’ reluctance to fight Assad, lead to a formidable coalition of anti Assad groups attacking IS, and quickly it was on the retreat in Eastern Syria.

However as the spoils of war came in from the conquests in western Iraq, the IS has reallocated vital supplies, including American made Humvees, to the Syrian front-lines. The augmented moral, combined with the new supplies largely explain IS’ recent advances in Syria.

Its strategy has also developed. As Hassan Hassan noted in a recent article, their forces increasingly use diplomacy to take over villages. As long as the inhabitants lay down their weapons and pledge allegiance to IS, the village is spared attack. This new more benevolent strategy should be seen in light of the vast territory it now controls. IS does not have the manpower to impose its strict rules in all the territory under its possession. Currently, it is therefore utilizing a policy of accommodation with the populace. Over time, and as its military conscripts increase, it is more likely to become more forceful.

This strategy is likely to become very effective. As its geopolitical achievements, coupled with its military arsenal and funds grow day by day, it will be more likely to attract public support from Syrians and Iraqis who make up the vast majority of its fighters. These young men are not necessarily believers in grandiose ideas of creating an Islamic state. But they will be much more comfortable fighting with a force that is well equipped and that wins battles. For a young Syrian, it is undoubtedly more fulfilling to ride on the back of a Humvee conquering gas fields and villages than to be bogged down in never ending skirmishes in largely destroyed buildings in Aleppo.

IS the Fox

On many occasions, the IS has shown military prowess a skillful maneuvering on the terrain. For a long time, it fought skirmishes with the US troops and its Iraqi allies. Rather than confronting their enemy head on, as they did in Fallujah, they employed hit and run operations and sieges. All very familiar to those who have read Mao’s military tactics (for more information about the theoretical links between Maoism and other secular theorists impact on radical Islamic military doctrine, see Michael Ryan: Decoding the Al-Qaeda Strategy). Contrary to popular belief, Mosul did not fall over night. The take over by IS and its allies, was the culmination of months of strangulation by cutting off the supply routes between Baghdad and the city. The take over was only a culmination of years of insurgent attacks on the city and in fact the city has for long been one of the main sources of revenue as a result of extortion of its business owners.

The geopolitical puzzle

IS is a result of the turmoil in the region. No state actor wants it to succeed in establishing a state. However, states are using it to advance their geopolitical interests. Saudi Arabia sees the benefit of an IS in order to avoid a long feared Shia Crescent forming from Lebanon to Iran. At the same time, they fear them since the group is a real threat to their own stability. If IS is able to navigate between these fears, and gain temporary allies by recognizing its limits, it is more likely to succeed in its short term mission of holding on to some territory. Here we find a paradox and also a weakness. It mobilizes ideologically on the basis of being uncompromising in its reach. However were it to challenge Jordan, Saudi Arabia and countries beyond, it is likely to quickly be confronted from all sides.

The longer the regional crisis continues, the more entrenched the new state will become. If IS develops political callous in the midst of the chaos, and evidence shows that it has, it is likely to become an increasingly formidable foe. One which could possibly become a permanent feature in the region.

Its likelihood to hold on and expand its currently held territory lies in how capable it is in operating on a foreign policy based on realism – acting as Machiavelli’s fox – rather than only utilizing brute force. There is evidence to suggest that its leaders understand this and will use the knowledge to become a significant power. All the same, like so many revolutionary movements before it, IS is propelled by its universal ambitions which will make it difficult to stop its expansion. Its leaders have dazzled their supporters through maximal goals, minimal dithering, and lightning conquests. Reining in the expectations of its fighters will be difficult.

IS has conquered vast amounts of territory, sufficient in terms of resources to create a functioning state. However its permanence rests on its ability to restrain itself and appease its followers who believe and fight for its universal reach to become a reality here and now. If it restrains itself it is likely to lose supporters, including foreign fighters, if it does not, it will be challenged by forces that are likely to put it to an end.

IS feeds on the instability, and as long as the region remains tumultuous, the more likely they are to remain. A grand bargain is often used in foreign policy debates, but that is exactly what is needed in order to avoid the strengthening of IS. The group can not be seen as being an isolated result of the mess in Iraq and Syria. In some states’ views, it operates as a balance to counter Iranian hegemony. But its success impacts negatively on everyone. Only the United States has the power and influence to create the conditions necessary for a grand bargain between Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Gulf States, Iraq, Turkey and Syria.

Ultimately, the stability of the region is of primary concern for all states. If Iraq and Syria break apart, it will undoubtedly have effects on the cohesiveness of the main regional actors: Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

The US should utilize a three track policy. The first two are aimed at solving localized conflicts, and should be aimed at reassuring disaffected Sunni’s that the US has not realigned its foreign policy to appease Iran:

  • Train and equip the more nationalistic rebels in Syria so that they are powerful enough to serve as a military counterweight to Assad. They should not be able to win, but they should be strong enough to be seen as a threat to the current regime in Damascus. If they are not a balance to Assad, no viable dialog can take place between the warring factions. A negotiated settlement should be the aim.
  • Reach out to the disaffected Sunni community in Iraq including old enemies such as the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order. They, combined with the Military Council of the Tribes of Iraq, are powerful and secular forces currently allied with ISIS.
  • Thirdly, the US should act on a regional level:
  • Engage regional states, including Iran, in negotiations about the need for military disengagement from the conflicts. This will be anything but easy, however a redrawing of Middle Eastern borders is in no ones interest. Should IS establish itself borders will be redrawn.

Furthermore, the region is vulnerable to several actors becoming entangled in uncomfortable alliances with IS:

  • The Iraqi Kurds: if the central Iraqi government starts to battle the Kurdish regional Authority for control over Kirkuk, there could be a potential of a tacit alliance between them and IS.
  • The more nationalist Syrian rebels: if the Syrian army pushes ahead, and that the low level war between the SA and IS increases, they could become temporary allies.
  • Jordan: although Jordan fears IS (especially in light of growing support for them in the Ma’an and other parts of the country) it is for now a less of a foe than if Iraq and Syria fall completely under the control of Iranian aligned regimes.
  • Saudi Arabia: similar concerns as Jordan.

For any decision maker in Washington, it is of paramount importance that these regional weaknesses and alliances are understood and monitored. If they are not, the IS is likely to use them to their advantage.

*Matthias Baun Brubaker Christensen worked for the Danish Red Cross in Syria before and during the conflict. He earned his MSc from the University of London and is the producer of www.syrianactivists.org. He is based in Boston.

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카테고리: 시리아

The Six Words You Need to Know to Be a Successful Jihadi and Establish Your Own Caliphate

Syria Comment - 월, 2014-07-07 01:44

by Mohammad D for Syria Comment


Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the newly minted caliph of the “Islamic State,” chose the first Friday of Ramadan to make his first public appearance—ever. Until now he has worked outside the limelight, and the almost complete absence of his image in public media had generated a sense of mystique around his persona. Now, he has given a public sermon and led prayers at an impressive mosque in Mosul, available in the below video:

Shortly prior, the Islamic State (formerly ISIS, now simply IS), had declared through its spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani that it was establishing a khilafa (“caliphate”) in the land it controls in Syrian and Iraqi territory, over which the ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was to be the khalifa (خليفة الله في الأرض, “caliph”). Muslims have now been asked to swear allegiance to this new khilafa.

This comes at the chagrin of many other jihadis who had hoped to beat him to it, who had previously tried and failed, or who had a more “right” approach to doing so. No matter: now that we all know it’s doable, perhaps you’d also like to try your hand at the caliphate game? Here’s a handy manual of the primary words to keep ever upon your tongue as you move through the stages of establishing your own caliphate…

Every jihadi speech contains key words that sum up their purpose and express their objectives.  The concepts behind these terms constitute the building blocks for the establishment of khilafa and can help explain the recent rise of ISIS/IS and al-Baghdadi.

The following 6 terms correspond to consecutive stages integral to actualizing the jihadi goal and reveal much about the beliefs that motivate jihadis.


1 al-Taqwa التقوى

Al-taqwa simply means performing what Allah has ordered of you.  It is to obey Allah’s wishes as well as to fear him.  “Ittaqi Allah,” a widely used phrase, means fear Allah and obey his wishes.  This readiness to follow Allah’s will is an important stage of being that you must reach before embarking on your mission.  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in almost all of his speeches, asks the Muslims to be muttaqiin and to yattaqu Allah, both of which mean to do what Allah has set forth in the Qur’an.

In his speech, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi first quoted from the Qur’an’s sura “‘Umran,” verse 102:


“O you who have believed, fear Allah as He should be feared and do not die except as Muslims [in submission to Him].”

Al-Baghdadi then quotes the sura “al-Ahzab” verses 70-71:


“O you who have believed, fear Allah and speak words of appropriate justice. He will [then] amend for you your deeds and forgive you your sins. And whoever obeys Allah and His Messenger has certainly attained a great attainment.”

In the second part of his speech, al-Baghdadi told his audience that to yataqqu Allah and begin jihad for his sake is necessary whether they want security, work, or an honorable living.


2 al-Nafeer  النفير

Al-nafeer means, in the jihadi context, mobilization to join the battle.  It is the initial step: the switch from life as a civilian citizen of a certain nation-state to the role of a mujahid who obeys a new set of specific rules.  The term is drawn from many Qur’anic verses that mention al-nafeer.  Anytime a jihadi wants to recruit someone, he invokes al-nafeer and, of course, the related verses in the Qur’an.  Also, it is used anytime someone wants to collect money for Jihad.

Al-Nafeer connotes having left everything, making the decision to join the fight, ready to die.  The derived verb is nafara نفر(past tense) or yanfuru ينفر(present tense).  When someone Yanfur ila Sahat al-Ma’raka (ينفرإلى ساحة المعركة), it means he is ready to die, and is expecting to die with a “guarantee” for a better existence in the afterlife. When a person decides to yanfur (join the fight), jihadists say that he is allowed to disobey his parents and the authorities and is no longer beholden to any laws but those of Islam (and, of course, his sect’s interpretation of Islam).  The governments that are fighting the mobilization of their kids for jihad raise this issue frequently, featuring the arguments of religious scholars who oppose the jihadist interpretation.

Of Qur’anic verses mentioning al-nafeer, three are most significant. These verses are loaded with interpretive meaning, and much has been written about them. It is common to hear them referred to in speeches, tweets, sermons, and so forth.

a) إنفِرُواْ خِفَافًا وَثِقَالاً وَجَاهِدُواْ بِأَمْوَالِكُمْ وَأَنفُسِكُمْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ ذَلِكُمْ خَيْرٌ لَّكُمْ إِن كُنتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ

Translation: “Go forth, whether light or heavy, and perform jihad with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah. That is better for you, if you only knew” (Qur’an 9:41).

In this verse Allah is ordering the Muslims to conduct al-nafeer, light or heavy.  “Light” means you leave your home with nothing.  “Heavy” means you leave your country for the land of jihad with money, equipment, etc.  The verse then issues the command to join al-jihad with your money and yourself.  Here, in common interpretations, those who cannot go make jihad physically are charged to fundraise on behalf of those who can.  The belief is that if you prepare a person for jihad (i.e. finance his preparedness for battle), you will be considered as though you have gone to wage jihad yourself.

b) يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ مَا لَكُمْ إِذَا قِيلَ لَكُمُ انفِرُواْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ اثَّاقَلْتُمْ إِلَى الأَرْضِ أَرَضِيتُم بِالْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا مِنَ الآخِرَةِ فَمَا مَتَاعُ الْحَيَاةِ الدُّنْيَا فِي الآخِرَةِ إِلاَّ قَلِيلٌ

Translation: “O you who have believed, what is [the matter] with you that, when you are told to go forth [derived imperative of nafeer] in the cause of Allah, you adhere heavily to the earth? Are you satisfied with the life of this world rather than the hereafter? But what is the enjoyment of worldly life compared to the hereafter except a [very] little” (Qur’an 9:38).

This verse is used to admonish those considered lazy, who prefer the contentment of their normal lives over making jihad, neglecting to appreciate the magnitude of the afterlife.  (Of course, the afterlife of he who joins jihad is Paradise.)

c) إِلاَّ تَنفِرُواْ يُعَذِّبْكُمْ عَذَابًا أَلِيمًا وَيَسْتَبْدِلْ قَوْمًا غَيْرَكُمْ وَلاَ تَضُرُّوهُ شَيْئًا وَاللَّهُ عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ

Translation:  “If you do not go forth, He will punish you with a painful punishment and will replace you with another people, and you will not harm Him at all. And Allah is over all things competent” (Qur’an 9:39).

In this verse Allah says that if you do not do mobilize (derived verbal form from nafeer) you are going to be tortured severely, and you and your people are going to be substituted by others by Allah, the one able to do anything.

In his speech, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi underscored the importance of joining Jihad, because, according to him, Allah had ordered it so that Islam could be established.

Here is a link to a video in which a Tunisian fighter explains the importance of nafeer and calls people to do nafeer “light” or “heavy:”


3 – al-Ribaat الرباط

For jihadis, al-Ribaat refers to the time spent at the battlefront.  Ard al-Ribaat أرض الرباط means the land where the battle occurs or is about to take place, against the enemy.  The verb raabata رابط (past tense) or yuraabitu يرابط (present tense) means to spend time in the trenches.  The concept is highly revered among Muslims, especially by jihadis.  The frontlines are also sometimes referred to as al-thughur الثغور.  Keep in mind that all of these words are rarely used in everyday language and have vastly different meanings when used in the modern era.

Al-Ribaat is mentioned in the Qur’an:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اصْبِرُوا وَصَابِرُوا وَرَابِطُوا وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

Translation: “O you who have believed, persevere and endure and remain stationed and fear Allah that you may be successful” (Qur’an 3:200).

And in the hadith we find emphasis on rewards for those who observe ribaat:

a) رباط يوم في سبيل الله خير من الدنيا وما عليها

Translation: “Observing ribaat for a single day is far better than the world and all that it contains.”

b) رباط يوم وليلة خير من صيام شهر وقيامه، وإن مات فيه جرى عليه عمله الذي كان يعمل وأجري عليه رزقه وأمن من الفتان

Translation:  “Observing ribaat in the way of Allah is far better than fasting in the month of Ramadan and all the nighttime worship activities that are associated with that month.  And, if one dies while observing ribaat he will go on receiving his reward for his meritorious deeds perpetually and he will be saved from calamities.”

c) رباطيوم في سبيل الله خير من ألف يوم فيما سواه من المنازل

Translation: “Observing a day of ribaat for the sake of Allah is better than a thousand days in any other place.”

d)كل ميت يختم على عمله إلا المرابط في سبيل الله فإنه ينمي له عمله إلى يوم القيامة، ويؤمن من فتنة القبر

In this Hadith we see that whoever does ribaat for the sake of Allah is exempted from the calamities that happen between death and judgment day (special “tortures of the grave” exacted by Allah on the sinful while still in their graves, prior to the judgment).

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi regularly speaks of ribaat, though in his speech he only alluded to it without using the word. In the following video, a missionary of jihad mentions more hadith about al-Ribaat:


4 – al-Thabaat  الثبات

Al-thabaat means steadfastness, or to be able to hold your lines in the fight.  It also means to stick to your beliefs, and in this case, your decision to fight.  It is the ability to stay put in the face of adversity in the “arenas of jihad.”  In their speeches, many jihadis call for the strength to stay true to the goal.  Many historical references are made in conjunction with this term, most importantly to events from the days of the Prophet Mohammad, such as the battle of Uhud.  Frequent references to Qur’anic verses mentioning the term are made.

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِذَا لَقِيتُمْ فِئَةً فَاثْبُتُوا وَاذْكُرُوا اللَّهَ كَثِيرًا لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

Translation: “O you who have believed, when you encounter a company [from the enemy forces], stand firm and remember Allah much that you may be successful” (Qur’an 8:45).

This above verse is used by jihadis on a regular basis.  It asks the believers to hold their position and pray to Allah when faced with adversaries in battle.  It is therefore very important to every jihadi to read the Qur’an and hadith and to mention Allah whenever he is in battle.  The word “Allah” and the adjectives normally attached to it are abundant in jihadi rhetoric, sprinkled within almost every sentence any jihadi utters.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdai mentioned al-thabaat in the second part of his speech.  He beseeched Allah to “yuthabet” (hold firm) the feet of the mujahideen. The Qur’anic references for al-Baghdadi are these verses:


Translation: “And when they went forth to [face] Goliath and his soldiers, they said, ‘Our Lord, pour upon us patience and plant firmly our feet and give us victory over the disbelieving people’” (Qur’an 2:250)

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنْ تَنْصُرُوا اللَّهَ يَنْصُرْكُمْ وَيُثَبِّتْ أَقْدَامَكُمْ

Translation: “O you who have believed, if you support Allah, He will support you and plant firmly your feet” (Qur’an 47:7).

Al-thabaat also has a lot to do with courage.  It is very common to hear every jihadi and suicide bomber include the word thabaat in their speeches—even Chechens and other non-Arabic-speakers use this word prolifically.  A very common phrase is to ask Allah for al-thabaat: “…نسأل من الله الثبات”


5 – al-Tamkeen التمكين

Al-tamkeen means simply to be able to control what you have taken and establish yourself within it.  The Qur’an provides the basis for the concept of tamkeen as something done over a piece of land.  At this stage the group must create the infrastructure of a state. Islamic scholars have, of course, written volumes about it, but the basic idea is conveyed by the following Qur’anic verse:

وَنُرِيدُ أَنْ نَمُنَّ عَلَى الَّذِينَ اسْتُضْعِفُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَنَجْعَلَهُمْ أَئِمَّةً وَنَجْعَلَهُمُ الْوَارِثِينَ   وَنُمَكِّنَ لَهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَنُرِيَ فِرْعَوْنَ وَهَامَانَ وَجُنُودَهُمَا مِنْهُمْ مَا كَانُوا يَحْذَرُونَ

Translation: “And We wanted to confer favor upon those who were oppressed in the land and make them leaders and make them inheritors, and establish them in the land” (Qur’an 28:5-6).

الَّذِينَ إِنْ مَكَّنَّاهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ أَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتَوُا الزَّكَاةَ وَأَمَرُوا بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَنَهَوْا عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ ۗ وَلِلَّهِ عَاقِبَةُ الْأُمُور

Translation: “Those who, if We give them authority in the land, establish prayer and give zakah and enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong. And to Allah belongs the outcome of [all] matters” (Qur’an 22:41).

وَعَدَ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنْكُمْ وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ لَيَسْتَخْلِفَنَّهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ كَمَا اسْتَخْلَفَ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ وَلَيُمَكِّنَنَّ لَهُمْ دِينَهُمُ الَّذِي ارْتَضَىٰ لَهُمْ وَلَيُبَدِّلَنَّهُمْ مِنْ بَعْدِ خَوْفِهِمْ أَمْنًا ۚ يَعْبُدُونَنِي لَا يُشْرِكُونَ بِي شَيْئًا ۚ وَمَنْ كَفَرَ بَعْدَ ذَٰلِكَ فَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْفَاسِقُونَ

وَأَقِيمُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتُوا الزَّكَاةَ وَأَطِيعُوا الرَّسُولَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُرْحَمُونَ

Translation: “Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [to authority] upon the earth just as He granted it to those before them and that He will surely establish for them [therein] their religion which He has preferred for them and that He will surely substitute for them, after their fear, security, [for] they worship Me, not associating anything with Me. But whoever disbelieves after that – then those are the defiantly disobedient.  And establish prayer and give zakah and obey the Messenger – that you may receive mercy” (Qur’an 24:55-56).

In his speech, al-Baghdadi stressed this concept.  He said that having the might to do tamkeen is part of observing Islam correctly (being able to force others to do what you believe is right), and quoted this verse:

لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ ۖ وَأَنْزَلْنَا الْحَدِيدَ فِيهِ بَأْسٌ شَدِيدٌ وَمَنَافِعُ لِلنَّاسِ وَلِيَعْلَمَ اللَّهُ مَنْ يَنْصُرُهُ وَرُسُلَهُ بِالْغَيْبِ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ قَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ

“We have already sent Our messengers with clear evidences and sent down with them the Scripture and the balance that the people may maintain [their affairs] in justice. And We sent down iron, wherein is great military might and benefits for the people, and so that Allah may make evident those who support Him and His messengers unseen. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and Exalted in Might” (Qur’an 57:25).

After using this Qur’anic text, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi shouted a slogan of ISIS (the “foundation of religion” phrase from Ibn Taymiyah which is very important for jihadis), which is as follows: “The foundation of the religion is a book that leads and a sword that supports it” (قوام الدين كتاب يهدي وسيف ينصر).

The concept of tamkeen can explain why jihadis make the call for prayer every time they overrun a post.  In their creed, the power to raise your voice in the call to prayer is a sign of tamkeen—that you have control over the place.  The verbal form of this word is also used when ISIS soldiers are leading prisoners of war or after they behead someone, in such phrases as: “We thank Allah who made us control their necks” (نشكر الله الذي مكننا من أعناقهم).


6 – al-Istikhlaf   الإستخلاف

Al-istikhlaf is derived from the same root as the word khilafa (caliphate). This is when you, as a jihadi, get to kick it into the net: now that you’ve followed the rules, carried out Allah’s will, fought for the land, implemented control after being granted the land by Allah, it is now time for the final step—the establishment of a khilafa, i.e. a state that follows shari’at Allah, the laws of Allah.  Just remember that for your caliphate to be a legitimate one—not just a crazed delusion proclaimed by some fanatical wanabees—you must follow all the right steps, as outlined here, leading up to this one.

Al-Baghdadi spoke extensively on the concept of istikhlaaf in his speech, saying that after his group was able to exercise control it became their Islamic duty to declare a khilafa—the duty that Muslims had “lost for centuries.”  He stressed that “Muslims should always try to establish it [khilafa].”

Al-istikhlaf is based on several Qur’anic verses and hadiths:

قَالَ عَسَى رَبُّكُمْ أَنْ يُهْلِكَ عَدُوَّكُمْ وَيَسْتَخْلِفَكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ

Translation: “He said ‘Perhaps your Lord will destroy your enemy and grant you succession in the land and see how you will do” (Qur’an 7:129).

وَعَدَ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مِنكُمْ وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ لَيَسْتَخْلِفَنَّهُم فِي الْأَرْضِ كَمَا اسْتَخْلَفَ الَّذِينَ مِن قَبْلِهِم

Translation: “Allah has promised those who have believed among you and done righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [to authority] upon the earth just as He granted it to those before them…” (Qur’an 24:55).

The Qur’an mentions in many verses that the believers will inherit the earth.  It also states that Allah owns the land and that he will give it to his favorite followers.


Conclusion – Ready to Establish Your Own Caliphate, Baghdadi Style

If you’ve taken notes on the necessary stages of the jihadi project, you’re better prepared to follow al-Baghdadi’s example and pursue the establishment of your own caliphate (provided you purify your heart and all that). If you’re lucky, the loyal men you’ve surrounded yourself with (who don’t dare express dissent since they know death will be the penalty) will ‘elect’ you as the caliph!

In his first-ever public appearance, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wanted to demonstrate his control and prove that the time to remain hidden has passed.  As khalifa, he can now choose his whereabouts and act as a public figure.  Far from featuring Ramadan as the spiritual journey it is understood to be by most Muslims, al-Baghdadi turned it into a jihad-fest.  In the first sermon of Ramadan, he called Muslims to join the jihad and build khilafa.  He came dressed in black and walked with a limp, conveying that he had been wounded in the jihad.

Al-Baghdadi performed the duties of a khalifa: giving a sermon and leading the people in prayer.  He brandished his linguistic skills and some admirers praised him for having improvised his speech.  But don’t let this intimidate you regarding your own aspirations: if you really follow the speech of jihadis, you’ll find that they repeat a very finite number of limited concepts, encapsulated within the same few-dozen cookie-cutter sentences.

The post The Six Words You Need to Know to Be a Successful Jihadi and Establish Your Own Caliphate appeared first on Syria Comment.

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Muhajireen Battalions in Syria (Part 3)

Syria Comment - 월, 2014-06-23 23:57

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

I have previously documented muhajireen battalions here and here. Below are two more groupings.

Saraya ash-Sham

Logo of Saraya ash-Sham, whose main emblem resembles the flag of Iraqi insurgent group Jamaat Ansar al-Islam (pro-Caliphate and with deployment in Syria). The motto reads: “We shed tears and spill blood.”

Translating to “brigades/squadrons of ash-Sham” and operationally advertising itself since at least the autumn of last year, this group- in origin a merger of several small brigades- has been primarily active in the Homs area (including from within Homs city), and like the Lebanese-founded Jamaat Jund ash-Sham, it contains a mixture of native Syrians and foreign fighters: though according to a media activist for this group whom I interviewed, the “majority” of the group’s fighters are Syrians. To the extent that there are foreign fighters in this grouping, they are most likely Lebanese and other Levantines. To date, no muhajireen martyrdom notices have been publicly announced.

Ideologically, like most muhajireen and part-muhajireen battalions, Saraya ash-Sham espouses the establishment of a Caliphate, and officially took an anti-fitna stance on the al-Qa’ida-Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) dispute (as the media activist put it to me, “We are all brothers”), declaring support for Sheikh Muheisseni’s “Ummah Initiative” back in January. Indicative of the official anti-fitna stance as well is the fact that when Sheikh Abu Khalid al-Suri of Ahrar ash-Sham was killed in February, Saraya ash-Sham did not blame anyone in particular for the killing, but simply eulogised him. The group also coordinated with ISIS, Ahfad al-Rasul and other groups in fending off an attempted regime advance on the village of Aydun in Hama countryside, near an Alawite village called Khanifis.

With the regime’s clearance of the city of Homs and other key localities in the vicinity, it should be noted that Saraya ash-Sham, like Jamaat Jund ash-Sham (which was driven out of Krak des Chevaliers by the Syrian army and National Defence Forces) has largely ceased to be a meaningful entity in terms of operations.

Saraya ash-Sham fighters training in the Homs countryside.

Saraya ash-Sham fighters prepare to hit a regime forces base in Homs area.

Saraya ash-Sham fighters with special arm patches and headbands.

Despite the official anti-fitna stance of Saraya ash-Sham’s position on other groups, in practice Saraya ash-Sham, like Harakat Sham al-Islam, is closer to Jabhat al-Nusra than ISIS. This is a media graphic released in February of this year dedicated to fallen Saraya ash-Sham commander Abu Zubayr al-Homsi. Note the Jabhat al-Nusra logo on the top-right corner. In an accompanying message, Abu Mujahid ash-Shami- an official in Saraya ash-Sham- said the martyrdom notification was dedicated to “Jabhat al-Nusra in particular.” It appears there may be some personnel overlap between Saraya ash-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra.

Saraya ash-Sham graphic dedicated to slain field commander Sayyid Suleiman, who established his own brigade as part of Saraya ash-Sham in al-Khalidiya, Homs.

A Saraya ash-Sham graphic echoing the ISIS messaging motif of the looming conquest of Jerusalem. The text accompanying this graphic read as follows: “We fight in Homs al-Adiya and our eyes are on al-Quds al-Abiya.”

As above: “We fight in Homs and our eyes are on al-Quds.”

Saraya ash-Sham fighters in a training camp. From October 2013.

125 mm al-Quds artillery cannon operated by Saraya ash-Sham. From October 2013.

Saraya ash-Sham fighters praying. October 2013.

In November 2013, two more battalions joined Saraya ash-Sham: the Junud Allah brigade in Hama countryside, and the Usud ash-Sham brigade in Homs.

Saraya ash-Sham statement in January of this year supporting the Ummah Initiative.

ISIS- Gaza contingent

Just as ISIS has a special contingent for Libyan fighters- namely, the Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi, which previously played a pivotal role in the defence of ISIS’ southern Hasakah stronghold of al-Markadah from the attacks of Jabhat al-Nusra and other rebels and is now pushing deep into Deir az-Zor province, losing a number of fighters in the process- so ISIS also has a special contingent dedicated to fighters from Gaza.

This should come as no surprise. After all, images of support from Gaza for ISIS have been in evidence for nearly a year now, and when it came to the infighting between ISIS and other groups in Syria that broke out this year, the two main Gaza-Sinai jihadi groups- Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen- came down firmly on the side of ISIS. The Gazan contingent in turn reflects the division among the Palestinians outside Syria regarding the Syrian civil war: namely, that while there is no evidence Hamas has an organized presence in Syria to support the rebels and its insistence on neutrality is to be believed (much to the chagrin of the Islamic Front), Palestinian Salafi circles have been active in assisting the rebels.


A supporter of ISIS inscribes the group’s name on the beach in Gaza. Photo from September last year.

The Gazan religious instructor in this study circle was killed fighting for ISIS in Syria in September last year.

Gazan children show their support for ISIS. Photo from January 2014.

“From Gaza of glory to the mujahideen of the Islamic State: verily we love you in God. The Salafi Jihadi Movement- Gaza”- photo in support of ISIS from December 2013.

Wissam al-Atal: a doctor from Gaza who became a suicide bomber for ISIS in Syria last year.

“From Gaza of glory, our allegiance is to our amir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi”- a Gazan fighter shows his support for ISIS. Photo from February 2014.

Banner on the beach of Gaza hoisted in support of ISIS this month.

“Joy of the people of Gaza at the conquests of the Islamic State”- purported photo from the demonstrations held by Salafis in support of ISIS following news of the advances in Iraq. The rallies were subsequently broken up by Hamas police.

In Syria, the Gazan contingent of fighters that has emerged takes the name of the “Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi Brigade,” named after the founder and leader of the Salafi Jund Ansar Allah group in Gaza- Abdel Latif Moussa- who was killed in clashes with Hamas in 2009.

Training for the Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi brigade (photo released in April 2014): “Mujahideen of Gaza in the Islamic State’s Camps in ash-Sham.” Accompanying slogans on Twitter include “Coming, oh Jews,” reflecting the ambitions for the conquest of the whole Israel-Palestine area as part of ash-Sham.

As above.

As above.

Abu Khattab of Gaza, who died fighting for the Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi brigade in Syria.

The Gazan contingent burning cigarettes in Syria.

Gazan fighter shows children how to destroy cigarettes.

Gazan contingent handling raw meat. As with the Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi, standard ‘daily life of a mujahid’ messaging.

The Gazan contingent handles a gazelle for slaughter.

A photo that gives an idea of where the Gazan contingent has been deployed. Photo from outside ISIS’ Islamic police station in Manbij, Aleppo province.

“From the mujahideen of Gaza in the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: the Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi Brigade.”

It should be noted that undoubtedly with influence from Gaza, this pro-ISIS trend is catching on somewhat in the West Bank, which recently saw three teenagers kidnapped near Hebron by a group taking its name after ISIS, though the Israeli government is officially blaming Hamas as part of a propaganda line whereby there is a reluctance to acknowledge there is a more radical trend than Hamas emerging within the Palestinian population. Perhaps the emergence of this trend should not be surprising when one considers the widespread Palestinian support for Saddam Hussein as champion of their cause. Now, with the rise of ISIS and its extensive conquests and promises to liberate Jerusalem, it seems many Palestinians will be inclined to see ISIS as their new Saddam-style saviour figure.

ISIS graphic on social media to remind Palestinians and the Ummah that ISIS has not forgotten al-Quds (Jerusalem).

A young Palestinian girl shows her support for ISIS, which will supposedly open the path up to al-Quds.

ISIS billboard in Hasakah province from March 2014: “We fight in Iraq and ash-Sham and our eyes are on the Holy House [Bayt al-Maqdis].”

“Oh Quds, don’t cry…” Palestinian graphic in support of ISIS.

“Baqiya [ISIS slogan], Palestinian support, together in support of ISIS.” Palestinian graphic in support of ISIS using Iwo Jima imagery.

The main area to watch in terms of Palestinian support for ISIS is the Gaza-Sinai area, where pro-ISIS jihadis have been building their networks for some time. While the Hamas security apparatus is still resilient, as Jonathan Spyer, I would not be surprised if active pro-ISIS jihadis, assuming ISIS’ overall status and holdings are not diminished, attempt to take over Gaza within the next 5-10 years and proclaim an emirate of Gaza aligned with ISIS. 

The post Muhajireen Battalions in Syria (Part 3) appeared first on Syria Comment.

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“Bilal” – by Stephen Boeshaar

Syria Comment - 수, 2014-06-18 02:51

Stephen Boeshaar worked throughout the Arab World for many years and is fluent in Syrian Arabic. After serving with the Peace Corps in Morocco in the 1960s, he ran English language instruction programs in Yemen, Oman, Bahrain, and Syria, and worked with Fulbright in Egypt developing university curriculum. Later, Steve directed the American Language Center in Damascus for 20 years, until the Syrian uprising finally compelled him to leave with his family in 2012. He currently lives in Florida and is working on a collection of “Syrian Profiles,” stories of the many lives he encountered along his path. The following is an excerpt. Steve hopes to complete the book later this year. He can be contacted at stephenboeshaar@gmail.com




Bilal is now in his mid fifties and, like many aging men in Syria, his waistline has gradually expanded with maturity and prosperity. I had known him for more than 30 years and I watched this ballooning in his weight over time with some degree of alarm. He really needed to take better care of himself; that was my personal (and unspoken) opinion. On one of my visits to his home, he eagerly motioned me over as he lovingly unwrapped some old, wrinkled snapshots taken in his younger days, back in the 1970s. Most people in the West have no inkling how slavishly well-to-do classes of the third world have tended to adopt and mirror our own goofy fashions and fads. When we grew our hair long, hippie-style… well, so did the rest of the world. Thus, modern day Syria, for example, is currently awash in hip-hop music and tattoos.

Anyway, it was funny to see the brownish photos of Bilal sporting a Beatles-style mop top and dressed in garish disco attire; but what was the most striking was how amazingly fit and svelte he looked in those bell bottoms. He had been as skinny as a rail. He used to go to the gym too, and there were photos of him flexing like a young Schwarzenegger. What a contrast with his current well-fed portliness.

Bilal was the son of a prosperous shop owner and his family had always lived in a pretty nice fourth-floor apartment in an upscale neighborhood in central Damascus. However, it would be an error to imagine that he had had an easy life, by any means. Bilal spent two years in a technical institute after finishing high school but finding work in 1970s-era Damascus was a tall order. For one thing, the Syrian economy was overwhelmingly socialist in those times. Syria maintained its long love affair with the USSR during its Communist era and that special relationship has continued on to this day with contemporary Russia. In those quaint times of total central planning, Syria was probably the closest thing to a truly Communist system—outside of the Soviet bloc itself. Any Syrian who actually had a job worked for the state. For years, Bilal struggled to negotiate an opening into that vast, monolithic bureaucracy but it was no easy task. What you really needed was not education or job skills but “wasta,” which meant a connection to some big shot with influence who could find you a niche in the anthill.

For a long while, Bilal’s quest was futile. For a couple of years in the early 80s, he was reduced to driving a taxi in an effort to make some cash—certainly one of the most difficult and frustrating means of making a living imaginable. Most taxi drivers in Damascus do not own the cars they drive; instead, they must pay rent to the proprietor, buy gas and cover repairs on the vehicle. After shelling out for all the expenses, they struggle to eke out a meager living from whatever daily pittance they can grind out over a lengthy work day—10 to 12 hours or more. Foreigners in Damascus will find a cab ride to be one of the world’s best bargains. You can travel all the way across town for a couple of bucks. It is dirt cheap, even now in these days of high inflation. Great for the passenger but the flip side is, of course, how can any working stiff in Syria conceivably make a living from these fares, which are ferociously controlled at rock-bottom rates by the municipality? Bilal learned those lessons the hard way, back in the days when a taxi ride might cost you no more than 10 cents. The poor guy spent two hard years killing himself for peanuts.

Like most young Syrian men, Bilal had been drafted into the nation’s gargantuan military when he turned 18. It had been one of the largest armed forces in the Middle East for 40 years. Ironically, it hadn’t fought a real war since 1973, when it was severely beaten by the Israelis. Some claimed it was not a real army at all, but merely a device for maintaining the regime’s control over the country and for furthering its regional interests—as when it was used to occupy Lebanon during the 1980s and 1990s. Syrian military service was brutal and demeaning. The army did not even provide food or clothing—which had to be paid for by the recruits’ families. Bilal’s father was relatively well off and was able to pay enough to ensure him an easy posting in Latakia, up on the Syrian coast.

It was a direct consequence of his army service that Bilal finally hit pay dirt in his quest to find a post within the mysteriously opaque civil service. During his stint in the north, he managed to develop a useful contact, an Alawite military officer who seemed to look upon him favorably. According to Bilal, he spent more than 10 years cultivating the favors of this powerful warlord, through a long and persistent campaign of services, gifts, cajolery and flattery. It was like raising an exotic plant, one that you had to fertilize and water with utmost care. In the end, the suck-up efforts paid off and Bilal was duly rewarded with a position in the Syrian Customs Authority. This appointment was a genuine stroke of fortune, even if a customs officer was only a poorly-paid cog in the machine in Damascus. Sooner or later, however, the employee might well be permitted the golden opportunity to work on one of the Syrian borders. A border posting was the Holy Grail in the customs universe. Bilal endured an achingly long penance at the desk job in the central office; he had no choice but to watch, uncomplaining, as less qualified but more favored men moved ahead of him. After two or three years of agonizing patience, Bilal was at long last granted a six-month stint on the Syrian-Lebanese border. His ship had come in.

Syria has busy borders with Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. Consider the fact that tens of thousands of vehicles pass through those border posts every day—including large numbers of trucks and commercial carriers—and each one of these is a potential gold mine. Many of the truckers are carrying illegal or quasi-legal goods, making them ideal targets for shakedowns. The fact is, legal or illegal, the merchants and drivers who pass through these check points are expected to pay a bribe to be allowed to proceed. These payoffs are by no means an anomaly in the trade system; they ARE the system. It is the everyday grease that allows commerce to function all over the Middle East (and most of the rest of the third world as well). The customs agents are the lucky stiffs in the middle who regulate this seamy traffic. Regular travelers, whether ordinary Syrians or foreign tourists, are unlikely to even notice anything afoot—unless they get caught actually attempting to conceal items such as major appliances or weapons, for example.

Taxi men and bus drivers typically engage in petty smuggling of items like cigarettes or booze. They may have to cough up a nominal sum (or a couple of packs of smokes) but it is the big trucks where the real money is to be made. According to Bilal, the art of the trade is to hit up the drivers for a reasonable amount, without getting greedy. Everyone knows the going rates, more or less, and a timely payment will guarantee a cursory inspection of your vehicle, followed by a friendly wave through. The startling truth is that the system ensures that hardly a single solitary shipment ever gets opened and inspected. You can run just about anything through those borders, up to and including WMDs, if you play your cards right.

Bilal had struck pay-dirt. His fortunes (and his income) soared dramatically in those heady days when he was out at one of the border posts. Periodically, he got assigned to the crossings with Iraq and Jordan. But, sadly, he pouted, never the Turkish border, which was reputed to be the busiest and most lucrative. After years of desperate penury, Bilal and his family were suddenly living high on the hog. Another man might have saved some of this largess for a rainy day, another might have invested; but Bilal would always spend it freely—mostly on the stuff of the good life. He and his wife promptly bought themselves an expensive apartment and a new car. Later on, he got additional cars and small apartments for his two grown sons. Suddenly nouveax-riche, Bilal’s family saturated the house with costly, overstuffed furnishings and took to wearing expensive designer clothes and jewelry.

When we would meet, they would eagerly show us their latest purchases, apprising us in great detail how much they had paid. On those occasions when we stopped by Bilal’s house or went out for a meal with his family, we were struck by the degree to which the conversations invariably focused on material goods. The talk was always about cars, the price of real estate and the latest acquisitions for the home. Despite this slavish devotion to consumerism and material things, we never really felt irritated or offended by the litany of fiscal details. We understood, finally, that he and his family were not simply boasting or being smug, these material things constituted their only true passion in life. Without the cars, the clothes and the jewelry, what on earth would they have had to talk about?

Bilal’s overweight and the general state of his health became more of an issue after he hit 50. Despite its financial rewards, the customs job was pure murder. He had to put in crazy shifts, with long travel times to distant border crossings; sometimes he would not sleep for 24 hours. He often worked long nights. The job at the borders was highly stressful; shaking people down was profitable—but it was hard work. Moreover, the periods spent on the borders were short and unpredictable, mainly because of the intense pressures from within the bureaucratic corps. After all, every single officer in the customs service was busy jockeying for one of those plum assignments. When he was forced to return to Damascus for desk duty, Bilal’s income would plummet to near zero and he would again have to plot and spend his time and treasure maneuvering and cajoling, kissing up to the powerful functionaries who controlled the assignment rosters. He could never relax—and it showed.

Bilal, that young man who had once been so fit and athletic, had taken to smoking heavily early on in his customs career. He never exercised or watched what he ate. Frankly, he did not look well and his face showed an unhealthy pallor. It was just the way he was: working like a dog, living for the moment, buying stuff he didn’t really need, spending what he made while he had it. I guess he never thought about the future much.

As the first signs of the coming unrest appeared in Syria in 2011, we received some awful news. Bilal was in the hospital. Apparently, he had suffered a stroke and he had severe bleeding in his cerebral cortex. When we went to see him, he was still in a coma and he looked absolutely terrible. I think everyone assumed it was the end game, but, unexpectedly, Bilal rallied to recover… to some extent. The problem was that he had clearly lost some essential brain functions. He was now no longer able to care for himself; his long-suffering wife, who had struggled so long to raise their two boys, now had a new child to attend to, one who would never grow up. Bilal had killed himself at that job. He had never failed to protect and support his family, but now, work was out of the question. No more distant borders for him—no more windfalls; he had reached the end of his long and exhausting road.

We still sometimes visit Bilal; he does not talk but he smiles and follows our conversations with alertness. He is only a shadow of himself now but at least he is much thinner and the long years of strain and pallor have been erased from his face. Syria may now be at war, but Bilal has found his peace.

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Joshua Landis & Robert Ford discuss Syria at Wilson Center event

Syria Comment - 월, 2014-06-16 07:34

Joshua Landis, Robert Ford (former US Ambassador to Syria), and Hadi Al Bahra (Syrian opposition) each gave unique perspectives on Syria policy in a recent event with the Wilson Center, moderated by Aaron David Miller.

Dr. Landis outlined three possible policy options for Syria (in the absence of putting troops on the ground of a foreign interventionist force), none of which offer much optimism for restored stability or comprehensive peace: 1) Supporting a rebel win in Syria that would entail the need for rebels to conquer almost all of Syria’s major cities in street-by-street battles (since rebel-held cities are currently very few), resulting in tremendous instability, added destruction, and greater refugee crises; 2) Allowing security and counter-terrorism concerns to influence the choice to sit back and allow Assad to retake most of the country, which may limit jihadist gains but will allow the regime’s policies of torture, mass killings, and human rights abuses to continue unabated; 3) De facto partition that would involve shoring up support for the opposition—enough support to take certain key areas and enforce partition by pressuring the regime into a ceasefire & territorial concessions, but not enough to conquer the entire country—followed by a major project to introduce a moderate oppositional government in the rebel partition that could combat jihadism.

At present, the international players are not satisfied with allowing either side to win, which is why the conflict will remain at a “low boil” in which the opposition is kept on life support but will remain largely ineffective, while the Syrian people are sacrificed on the altar of great power politics.

The audio of the event can be accessed on the Wilson Center’s website, here:

What’s To Become of Syria? U.S. Policy, the Opposition and the Regime

Ford begins speaking at 11:35, Landis begins at 17:30


Take a look at this interesting infographic underscoring the complexity of alliances and competitions within the Syria conflict (thanks to " href="https://twitter.com/p_vanostaeyen" target="_blank">Pieter Van Ostaeyen for circulating it, from an article by Think Progress):

Why The Middle East Is Now A Giant Warzone, In One Terrifying Chart

What started as a crackdown against democratic protests three years ago, has become a region-wide conflict that now has Iraq descending back into chaos. The countries of the region — along with the United States and various non-state actors — all have a hand in creating this moment, as money, fighters, weapons, and a desire to control the Middle East have come together to produce an extremely volatile and terrifying situation.

What has made the Syrian conflict so difficult to respond to has been the fact that the situation has refused to be tied down as just a civil war. In addition to the top-line fighting between the Syrian government and rebels who’d like to oust Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, there’s also a proxy war ongoing between Sunni-majority states in the Gulf and Shiite-majority Iran and its allies. There’s also struggles for dominance among the rebels, who fight each other almost as frequently as the Assad government these days. Add in disagreements between the countries united against Assad over just which of the Syrian rebels to finance, and the reason a simple solution for the conflict hasn’t been developed becomes more understandable.

And standing out among all of this now is the attempts of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) — also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) — to establish its own state within the region. ISIS managed to takeover the city of Fallujah in January, hold it against Iraqi army efforts to dislodge it, and in the last few days take over both the major cities of Mosul and Tikrit. …

See also an updated map on the current situation in Syria from Thomas van Linge, also posted by Pieter:

…As well as another detailed map by Thomas on ISIS in Iraq:

The post Joshua Landis & Robert Ford discuss Syria at Wilson Center event appeared first on Syria Comment.

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The Future of ISIS and the Sectarian Response: ISIS has Picked a Fight it Cannot Win

Syria Comment - 월, 2014-06-16 07:20

The Future of ISIS in Iraq and the Sectarian Response – by Joshua Landis


ISIS purportedly conducting a mass execution of captured Shiite Iraqi army soldiers

A Washington policy analyst asked me what chances I gave to the possibility that Prime Minister Maliki will try to divide Sunnis and isolate ISIS by teaming up with moderate Sunnis. He raised the possibility of Maliki creating a government of national unity with greater power sharing.

My answer:

1. I doubt ISIS will get a foothold in Baghdad. Already, Shiite mobilization in the face of the ISIS advances are fierce and panicky.  I think Shiite religious mobilization now taking place in Iraq will mean very bad things for Sunnis in general. ISIS has picked a fight it can’t win and unleashed the inner Shi’a in their adversary. And it’s not as though Maliki, like Assad, lacks powerful friends with a serious stake in the outcome of the battle.

Rather than Maliki teaming up with “moderate” Sunnis, such as the US did in arming the tribes and cultivating the Sahwa, Iraq’s Prime Minister is likely to respond by using religion as his prime mobilizer. Of course, he will not abandon “Iraq” or nationalism, just as Assad has not.  But just as Sistani has used the sanctity of Shiite shrines as his primary “national” motivator, Maliki is likely to follow suit. He will largely define the nation in sectarian terms. That is what ISIS has done, as well. Sunnis have scared the pants off of Shiites. The photos of mass shootings of Shiite young men dooms a non-sectarian response, I would imagine. What is more, the gathering storm of sectarian mobilization has already reached furious levels in the entire region. The demonization of Shiites as “rejectors” and “Majous” or pagans who are considered both non-Muslim and non-Arab, has spread to such an extent that it has taken on a life of its own. The counter demonization of Sunnis, within the Shiite world, as terrorists, takfiris, and Wahhabi inspired agents is well entrenched.

2. I would not be shocked to see significant ethnic cleansing of Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad should ISIS attack and give the Iraqi Army a run for its money. After all, the Iraqi army is large, has helicopters, sophisticated intelligence capabilities, tanks, artillery and all the rest. They were caught napping and without esprit de corps, much as the Syrian army was. But capable officers will emerge who will strip down the “power-sharing” fat that the US built and rebuild it based on loyalty to Maliki and Shiism, if most of that has not been done already. This is what happened in Syria, when we saw the Syrian Army unravel at the base during the first year of the Sunni uprising. The Syrian military was quickly rebuilt along sectarian and regional lines to make it much stronger and more loyal, with locally recruited Iranian style National Defense Forces modeled on the Islamic Guard. If Sunnis choose to form such local militias and ally with the Shiite regime, so much the better. If they do not and choose to lay low until they figure out whether ISIS can win in their regions, the Shiites will go it alone and assume all Sunnis are a fifth column. That is how the Turks dealt with the Christians during WWI and the war with the Greeks. The 20% Christians in Anatolia of 1914 were cleansed. Jews in Palestine dealt with Muslims in a manner not altogether dissimilar. It didn’t turn out well for Christians in Anatolia or Muslims in Palestine.

3. We are not witnessing power-sharing or the emergence of a particularly destructive brand of religious nationalism in the region. We are witnessing the breakdown of the territorial nationalism that was implied by the borders drawn by Europeans at the end of WWI. The new nationalism, largely defined by religious affiliation, is apparent in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Palestine is a bit of an exception with the new coalition government, but not much of one.

My advice to Obama would be to lay low. This sectarian-nationalist process has been boiling up for a more than a century. It should be seen as part of the breakdown of the Ottoman order and emergence of nationalism. I compare what is going on in the Levant today to Central Europe during WWII. In Central Europe, the great powers drew national borders after WWI, carving up the lands of the defeated empires without rearranging the peoples to fit them. Thus Poland was only 64% Polish before WWII. Czechoslovakia was made up of close to 25% minorities. WWII was the “great sorting out.” (Read: http://qifanabki.com/2013/12/18/landis-ethnicity/ ) Over the war years, the peoples of central Europe were rearranged according to the WWI borders. By the end of WWII, Poland and Czechoslovakia had been reduced to their core Polish and Czechoslovak peoples. They got rid of their unwanted (Jews) or guilty (think the 12 million Germans of central Europe) minorities, along with many others. It was a nasty and brutal nation-building process.

Of course, in the Middle East, the emergence of national identities is bedeviled by competing religious identities, which seem to be stronger than both “Arabism” or “Iraqism.”

I doubt we will see high degrees of Shiite-Sunni cooperation in the coming months. If the U.S. sticks its long oar into this mess, the U.S. will end up with a broken oar. It seems possible that within the next two years, ISIS will largely be destroyed by the concerted action of both Iraqi and Syrian forces with help from Iran and possibly the U.S.  Sunni Arabs will not be pacified so long as they receive scant justice and minimal political representation in both Syria and Iraq, but ISIS cannot represent their needs. It is an expression of sectarianism run amok.

The post The Future of ISIS and the Sectarian Response: ISIS has Picked a Fight it Cannot Win appeared first on Syria Comment.

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Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Syria – by Fabrice Balanche

Syria Comment - 토, 2014-06-14 10:42

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Syria – by Fabrice Balanche


Bashar al-Assad is clearly on the path to victory by way of continuing gains since Qusayr in June 2013. From the spring of 2013, the Syrian army, helped by Hezbollah, has been retaking territories: the southern suburbs of Damascus, the Qalamoun, and most recently, the center of Homs. The Syrian regime is not only massively supported by Iran and Russia (something the insurgency lacks), but Assad also applies a highly effective strategy of counterinsurgency. The rise of Islamists against him provided the ideology that Bashar al-Assad needed, i.e. the fight against Islamist terrorists supported from abroad. By demonstrating his resoluteness, Bashar al-Assad wants to reassure his supporters and win over the silent majority. The latter no longer seek the return of peace, but are falling into line behind the force that can ensure their security and is most likely to win.

Several rapid and symbolic victories, such as the reclamation of Bab Amer in March 2012, provided material that the government could instrumentalize in propagandist argumentation, as they sought to convey to the population that the rebels were responsible for the death and destruction.

The al-Assad regime is now supported by a new civil and military elite, who have been promoted over the course of events, as less competent officers have been eliminated. The regime also benefits from strong Iranian logistical support in counterinsurgency. The military regime’s strategy is clear: to first concentrate the army’s efforts on the usable parts of Syria and on border control, and to then follow by resuming the effort to reclaim disputed territories, once securing greater support from the population for the cause of the regime. The chaos in areas held by the insurgency, with the attendant lack of civil administration (which is also partially due to the regime’s air raids), promotes the attractiveness of government-controlled areas (where the greatest majority of the 7 million internally displaced people are residing), which in turn bolsters the counterinsurgency.


Download the entire article (in French) from Syria Comment, or visit Fabrice’s Academia.edu page.

The post Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Syria – by Fabrice Balanche appeared first on Syria Comment.

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Religious Groups and Scholars of Islam in the Syrian Revolution – by Issam Eido

Syria Comment - 월, 2014-06-02 06:06

Issam Eido is a Neubauer Collegium Visiting Fellow and a Visiting Instructor of Islamic Studies and Arabic in the University of Chicago Divinity School. Dr. Eido’s research focuses on the Qur’an in late antiquity, hadith studies, and Sufi and Arabic literary and poetic studies. Graduating with his PhD in 2010 from Damascus University, he also served that institution from 2010-2012 as Lecturer in the Department of Qur’anic Studies and History of Islamic Sciences. In 2012 he was a Fellow of the “Europe in the Middle East/Middle East in Europe” research program at the Forum Transregionale Studien in Berlin. At the University of Chicago, he currently teaches Qur’anic Arabic.


Religious Groups and Scholars of Islam in the Syrian Revolution

by Issam Eido for Syria Comment

Clouds of ambivalence and uncertainty have obscured Syria’s religious landscape from the beginning of the revolution. In the particular way that the conflict developed across space and time, every individual affiliated with a religious group became compelled—sooner or later—to take sides. Needless to say, any declaration of alignment in the conflict carries serious consequences, especially for religious shaykhs who are looked to for guidance. If even tacitly supportive of the revolution, the position taken by shaykhs can lead to killings, arrests, or torture by the regime’s officers. On the other hand, a shaykh might lose his followers or be accused of being a spy or in-league with regime intelligence if he exhibits even nominal support for the opposition. Hence, the first stage of suffering was the dreadful obligation to choose a side, something that weighed on ulema everywhere and exacerbated whenever a shaykh’s popularity was on the rise or when there was specific danger in the area where he lived. Accordingly, the way that the conflict developed can help us understand the reason for the declarations of each shaykh at particular points in time, as well as explain (in some cases) why the focus was on one shaykh more than others.

The Syrian revolution has two trajectories: geographic and temporal:

The geographic trajectory of the revolution conferred upon the ulema—the Arabic word for Muslim religious and legal authorities—the responsibility to tell the truth about what was happening in the area where they resided. Accordingly, we understand that the first religious defection to occur was that of the mufti of Dara‘a, and that the first shaykhs who were exposed to killings, imprisonment, and other dangers were the shaykhs of Dara‘a. These were followed by those of the city of Homs whose shaykhs rebelled in their entirety, supporting the revolution from the oldest to the youngest. They subsequently suffered displacement, prison, or evacuation, including such shaykhs as Anas Swaid, Mamdouh Junaid, Adnan al-Saqqa. This city, therefore, didn’t experience the contravention of public expectations by any shaykh who had gained the trust of the people before the revolution. Moreover, some shaykhs of the city were leading demonstrations and giving speeches in public places, such as Shaykh Junaid. The city of Hama was the third city to engage strongly in the revolution, but it lacked prominent religious leaders because most of its significant figures were killed, arrested, or evacuated during the events of the 1980s. Since then, fear of persecution has led most of its shaykhs and students to follow ulema from Damascus and Aleppo.

As for Damascus, the revolutionary activity was divided between the city and its countryside. While the countryside was among the most active regions of the revolution since its beginning, demonstrations in the city were limited to a few mosques such as the al-Hasan and al-Rifai mosques. Therefore, we can understand the great weight of responsibility that the ulema of these places took on. While the countryside of Damascus didn’t witness any support for the regime on the part of any prominent shaykh (in particular in Dariyya, Muddamiya, Doma, and Harasta), the people of Damascus heard vague statements and declarations coming from their ulema. Among the Damascene ulema we do not find a direct and obvious declaration inviting people to demonstrate against the regime, yet most of their statements contained calls for an end to oppression, an urging for justice, and calls for political change and reform. However, the continuity of demonstrations that were occurring at the al-Hasan and al-Rifai mosques exposed their shaykhs to direct harm. Shaykh Kurayyemal-Rajeh was only placed under house arrest (by the Minister of Endowments), but Shaykh Usama al-Rifai was directly assaulted by security forces and armed shabiha on the holiest night of the Islamic calendar (the night of al-Qader, near the end of Ramadan). Then, Al-Rajeh and Al-Rifai departed the country, and founded a new association of ulema about which I will speak later.

As Aleppo joined the revolution later in 2012, most of its ulema avoided overt opposition of the regime. However, most of its prominent ulema did sign statements urging all to end the killing and oppression, and requesting relief for affected people, especially those in Homs. Still, these ulema were subjected to some degree of questioning, but not to the same extent of those in other cities, as the regime sought to give the impression that Aleppo was its spoiled child.

With regard to the temporal trajectory, the Syrian revolution underwent a number of major transitions: The first stage was peaceful protests; these were followed by the defecting of many soldiers from the regime’s army; then there was the establishment of the Free Army; then the discussion surrounding the announcement of Jihad; and finally the present situation with the emergence of civil and militant Salafi groups.

Before delving into the details of this trajectory, I should point out that traditional Islamic thought, which occupies almost all the discourse of Syrian religious individuals, groups and institutions, is generally a conservative form of thought. Namely, it generally conforms to the established traditions and norms, and does not possess a spirit of initiative and change. In addition, it is—in the Syrian case—moderate. Accordingly, its pronouncements are always late and after-the-fact, which causes it to lose its sheen.

In the first six months of the revolution, the religious groups were moderate. They did not prefer change by force and only issued vague statements. But this situation changed during Ramadan of 2011 when the regime used heavy military force in Hama. The revolution’s trajectory quickly began to shift toward an armed revolution, in particular after the first military defection, that of Husain al-Harmoush. Many official persons followed his lead, such as the mufti of Dara‘a and the later striking announcement of defection of young women from the Qubaisyyat, a group for Muslim women that is known for its political quietism.

In examining this trajectory, we see that the structure of the religious groups started to disintegrate and crumble as a result of multiple factors: the defections of followers, the departure of shaykhs from the country, the loss of shaykhs’ popularity, and members adopting a new outlook and changing allegiance to other groups with different ideas about how to manage the situation. The changing structure of these groups was very deep.

We can classify Syria’s old and newly-emergent religious groups according to the following six categories:

  • First: Groups that support the revolution explicitly: most religious groups and their shaykhs in the Syrian countryside around most cities explicitly announced their support for the revolution. Some observers attributed this to a rural reaction against cities and against the official religious and political discourse that for many years had marginalized the countryside. But this analysis does not apply to some groups who worked for years prior to the revolution to develop a moderate or reformist religious discourse concerned with values of dignity, justice, and equality such as Shaykh Jawdat Saedd and Muaz al-Khateeb’s group. In addition, we find that most religious groups and leaders in Dara‘a, Homs, Hama, and most northeastern Syrian cities explicitly announced their support the revolution. There are also some ulema who openly declared their opinion in support of the revolution, such as Shaykh Ihsan Badarani—the religious advisor to the previous president Hafiz al-Assad. Badarani had been marginalized by the Syrian regime and religious institutions throughout Bashaar al-Assad’s reign, and some attributed his support for the revolution to this marginalization.


  • Second: Groups that support the regime explicitly: It is difficult to identify a religious group that supported the regime, except the ministry of endowments’s official institutions, its branches in cities, and some institutions that are associated with the ministry, such as the Abu al-Nour (Kuftaro) Institute. The ministry of endowments strove throughout the revolution to establish new groups and associations under different titles such as “The Association of Damascene Ulema” claiming that ulema actually supported the regime. These new associations often included some imams of mosques and some directors of official institutes like the directors of Abu al-Nour and al-Fateh Institutes, as well as some muftis. But the most prominent figures of these associations were the internationally renowned al-Buti and the grand Mufti Hassoun. While the Hassoun’s attitude was not surprising, al-Buti’s statements, speeches, lessons, and fatwas were surprising and generated many discussions and debates in online forums. This resulted in him losing most of his followers as we see in a record on the internet showing that only 20 to 40 students continued attending his lessons compared with a huge number of students who were attending prior to the revolution. Ultimately, al-Buti and many of his students were massacred during one of his weekly lessons in March 2013 in a well-known Damascus mosque, although there are conflicting reports about who was responsible.


  • Third: Groups that nominally support the regime: Most groups whose attitudes are ambiguous are Sufi groups and the Qubaisyyat (the group for religious Muslim women). While some activists claim that these groups support the revolution, others provide records that prove their support for the regime. In the case of the Qubaisyyat, the regime strove to display them as supporters by means of some pictures that showed them meeting with the president—an event that many said happened under coercion. As for Sufi groups, the ambiguity of their attitude was to be expected, as these groups are concerned mainly about individual and spiritual affairs rather than public ones. This, however, led to many questions about the role of these groups. Ambiguity was the general feature of most Sufi groups in Aleppo, such as the Keltawiyya, some of whose followers leaked a record indicating that their Shaykh Mahmoud Hout supported the regime and insulted the rebels. But afterwards, other followers leaked a record which indicated his criticism of the regime. It would be mistaken to assume that this pattern of ambiguity applied to all Sufi groups, as there were instances that stood in stark contrast, such as that of Shaykh Abu al-Huda al-Yaqubi in Damascus and Shaykh Mahmoud Abu al-Huda al-Husaini in Aleppo whose support for the revolution was explicit early on. Some attributed this to their higher levels of education.


  • Fourth: Groups that nominally support the revolution: Most Damascene and some Aleppan ulema fell into this category during the first year of the revolution. This ambiguity started to change when the revolution reached Aleppo and Damascus. A good example of where we can see this ambiguity is in the Shari‘a faculties of universities where most of the lecturers supported the revolution with indistinct, opaque language. They were reluctant to exhibit overt support because they were suffering concern on two fronts: the fear of the official channels of Syrian intelligence as well as pressure from their own colleagues.


  • Fifth: New groups outside Syria: in the first year of the revolution, some new organizations were established by Syrian ulema, most of whom had already been living outside of Syria before the revolution began. One example is the “Syrian Ulema Association” whose head is Shaykh Ali al-Sabouni and whose vision is basically traditional. This organization issued many statements that are considered the first religious statements against the regime. The “Syrian Islamic Forum” was established in Istanbul by a number of Syrian ulema. These had escaped from the country with a few exceptions like Shaykh Anas Swaid from Homs. Although this institute relies on shari‘a as the source of law, it sees citizenship as a right for all Syrians, and it describes itself as moderate and committed to developing an open and deep Islamic discourse. There is also the “Islamic Organization of Sham (Greater Syria)” that was also established in Istanbul at the end of 2011 by ulema unknown to most Syrians, and which presented itself as an extensive Islamic reformist organization that considered citizenship a right for all Syrians. However, the most important organization founded during the revolution was “The Ulama of al-Sham Association” which was created quite late (Sept. 2012) in Doha by several ulema who escaped from Syria, such as Shaykh Kurayyem al-Rajeh, the association’s head, Shaykh Usama al-Rifai the deputy, Saria al-Rifai, Rateb al-Nabulsi, Mamdouh Junaid, Adnan al-Saqqa, and Abd al-Kareem Bakkar. These scholars aimed to support the revolution through “Jihad al-Kalima”—a jihad through words—to form a religious reference point through which they could advise rebels on how to act according to shari’a, propagate a moderate discourse that dismisses sectarian behavior, and deal with all Syrians as equals.


  • Sixth: New groups growing inside Syria: Most of these groups have been founded in exceptionally violent circumstances, and have generally emerged as a reaction to brutal acts of the regime, or as relief groups and judicial councils in the areas that moved out of the regime’s control. These groups can be classified according to three types: ulema, judges, and armed militants. However, these groups generally have two common features: they are young and rural. Since the armed groups emerged as a reaction to the regime’s brutality, they generally promote extreme attitudes which often adopt the Salafi vision. As for other groups, they are almost all students of Syrian universities, in particular the shari‘a colleges, a fact which bolstered their credibility and gave them a level of trustworthiness. We see this in the countrysides of Aleppo and Damascus in such examples as the Association of Ulema in Jabal al-Zawia and the local judgment council in the countryside of Aleppo.

We can now conclude with several points:

  • Most official religious institutes have continued supporting the regime, in particular the Ministry of Endowments and its institutes, such al-Fateh, Abu al-Nour, and the Syrian Mufti.
  • Most traditional institutes, in particular mosques providing lessons, ceased their activities as most ulema fled to neighboring countries.
  • New groups emerged inside Syria, most of whose ideas are based on criticizing the official and traditional religious and legal discourses, in which most of these growing groups believed that these religious and legal discourses were one of the most important reasons for the continuity of the Ba‘ath regime.
  • However, the traditional ulema still have popularity among Syrian people especially in Damascus where conservative and moderate Damascenes consult the opinions of these ulema regarding every event.
  • The general religious landscape of Syria is currently characterized by two primary views: that of the late prominent Shaykh al-Buti who strongly supported the regime, and that of the many religious groups who believe that the battle represents a religious and sectarian conflict. This fact prompted many wise ulema and groups outside Syria to strive to conduct a non-sectarian revolution that would emphasize a citizenship of greater inclusivity. However, with the continuous brutality of the regime, the lack of any convincing political solution, and the passive role of the international community, Syria continues to be entrenched in sectarian conflict, remaining an ideal environment for the operation of extremists.

The post Religious Groups and Scholars of Islam in the Syrian Revolution – by Issam Eido appeared first on Syria Comment.

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Syrians in Lebanon Vote in Presidential Elections

Syria Comment - 목, 2014-05-29 15:39

My brother voted 'no' in the Syrian embassy in Moscow during 1980s Hafez 'election'. His passport was revoked & never able to go back since

— اغين الزعبي (@agh_yan) May 28, 2014


As Syrians abroad have been gathering to vote in the presidential elections at Syrian embassies around the world, Anne Barnard tweeted from the scene in Beirut. These tweets were very interesting, and I am providing them below, along with a few from others. An article on the voting in Lebanon was also published by Anne today, here. These elections began with bids submitted by more than 20 candidates, all but three of which were disqualified by Syria’s supreme court. Not long after, one of the surviving candidates, Hassan al-Nuri, stated that “There are no losers in these elections because we are all winners; as of now I consider myself a winner and the presidential chair is not the goal.” A Press TV interview with candidate Hassan al-Nuri is available here.

Oliver Holmes: Tens of thousands of Syrians abroad vote in early poll 

AP: Assad’s supporters abroad vote in Syrian election

VICE: Polls Open in Syrian Elections, but Real Choices Are Hard to Find

Shweta Desai: In Delhi’s Vasant Vihar, 750 Syrians line up to vote in an election denounced by critics as a farce

Voting taking place in environments where one candidate is explicitly promoted – Photo: Scroll.in

The National: Syrian elections put Tehran and Moscow in a fix


Main road to Baabda from Beirut clogged as some of 1M Syrians in Leb head toembassy for presidential elections. Refugees/expats vote today.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Minibus w/Assad pic on rear window, young men hanging out door w/ Syria flag. Women in back look more glum. Some cars play patriotic songs.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Lebanese colleague remarks, Syrians voting here for president & we Lebanese can't manage to agree on a president!

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Syrian colleague on other hand jokes that Lebanese commuters late for work will be pissed at this Syrian "occupation" of the highway.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

One car w/Hezbollah flag and poster praising Assad: "you are the lion of the Arabs and the others are half men."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

One carload waves Syria govt flag but says don't take our photo: "we don't want to be famous."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Another car: skinny middle aged driver with wristband w/heart shaped Syrian flag and cap in English: "I (heart) Bashar."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

At least five breakdowns/accidents on way to Syria voting. Scores of people walking uphill to Baabda after Lebanese army checkpoint.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Some anti-government Syria activists say embassy people visited camps to tell ppl you must vote if you ever want to go back home. Took names

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

But embassy official says it was just registration process. #pt Embassy crowded recently w/ppl doing paperwork to vote.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Embassy is on narrow street shaded by eucalyptus in shadow of monument to Leb civ war at min of defense: tanks embedded in concrete pillar.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Whole street blocked off, voters channeled thru lanes of plastic tape and metal detectors by Lebanese security.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

(Now continuing earlier tweets on Syria early voting in Lebanon. No signal in and around lone polling station at embassy in Baabda.)

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

One Lebanese guard spoke w/contempt of queuing Syrians: Don't get too close, you won't stand the smell, we'll have to call Red Cross for you

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Pandemonium inside. Embassy officials at long tables checking IDs. 100,000 preregistered to vote but doubtful they can in one day.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

People crushed into one small room, were handed flimsy glossy ballot w/ pix of three candidates. They borrowed our pens to mark their choice

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

talked to dozens, met no one voting for anyone but the president. Most said they're not refugees, live in Lebanon for work, study, marriage

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

But one guy from Jaramana said, "no need to lie, we came bc of the war, I will go back when there is security."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Charge d'affaires: only ppl who entered Leb legally at border posts can vote. That rules out many refugees, crossed all over porous border

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

But he said on June 3 ppl who crossed illegally can vote at border crossings. They have to pass Leb post but not Syrian one. Rules evolving?

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Said on June 3 ppl who failed to register can also vote. Said today you have to have registered by email fax or at embassy. But we saw guy/1

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Coming today not having registered earlier, they checked his ID and let him vote. Confusion even among poll workers on exact rules.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

For many there was a festival atmosphere. People waved Syrian flags and draped them over heard, chanted and cheered. Many Assad t-shirts

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Ahmed al-Ali from Aleppo marked ballot w/blood: "my blood type is Bashar." dabbed blood on his face. Restaurant worker, 16 (voting age 18).

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

One guy said "we were forced," then corrected: "it's natl duty." Some silent, grim but many seemed authentically enthusiastic.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

In the above tweet, the Arabic of the man’s comment was a bit ambiguous; he could have meant “we had to come,” though being forced seemed to be the sense he conveyed. Regardless, numerous reports have surfaced of many individuals believing they were coerced to vote, or were voting out of fear of the repercussions were they not to do so.

A feeling of empowerment for pro- Assad Syrians, by far most visible mass gathering here in years. Whole Baabda hwy thronged w/ppl walking.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

One Syrian more used to oppo crowds saw red black and white flag and reflexively thought: they're going to burn it. Of course, they waved it

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

No green, black and white flag, syria's 1st independence flag adopted by oppo, anywhere in sight – oppo boycotting or feel unsafe in embassy

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Abu Hatem, 34, plumber from Raqqa, voted "of course" for Bashar. "The good days are gone…only he can bring Syria back to its proud days."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Businessman Abu Mohammad, 25, "I'm a reasonable guy, an intellectual. Bashar is a doctor, he's smart, he's peaceful."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Souad Abu Hilal, 25, beautician, "I eat bread Bashar brings to Syria.. ev country has mistake, Bashar is going to fix all our mistakes." /1

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Her t-shirt: Shabiha forever. She made it herself. She said no one forced her to come. /2

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Sheikh Abdullah Nawer al-Nazal al-Ghadani al-anazi, insisted he was 35, looked 60, in robes, works on "reconciliation": I vote for the best

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

First refused to say for whom, but when heard reporter was from Damascus said: "Bashar."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Now for some tweets on the voting process itself. Room 20x30m max is only polling place for more than 1 million Syrians in Leb.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

When you enter, on right are airbrushed, identically sized portraits of Assad and two obscure opponents, Hassan al-Nuri & Maher al-Hajjar.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Volunteers at door handed us flimsy, glossy handbills w color portraits of the 3 & circles under them. thought info handout – but was ballot

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

We could easily have voted ourselves. No check on who got them or how many times. Ppl filled them out in public, no closed booths.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Some people had poll workers – embassy workers and volunteers in syria flag caps – fill out their ballot. Wrote "yes" or put an x.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

“Deal” should be “seal” in following tweet

Ppl put ballots in envelopes already stamped across the closure – some didn't bother to deal – and crowded around to stuff them into 4 boxes

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

In Damascus lately some activists at dawn left flyers around saying "don't vote." A small gesture to say some oppo still there.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

At beirut embassy ballot boxes, pushing and shoving as people navigate chaotic vote. Voters & embassy workers frazzled, hot, thirsty.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

In polling room crowd periodically broke into age-old chant: "with our souls, with our blood, we sacrifice for you, o Bashar!"

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Later, outside few blocks away, Syrian graphic design student using gas station toilet was asked why she walked uphill in sun to vote /1

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

She said "people came"-wouldn't say who – &said if u don't you may not be allowed into syria. She goes every month so didn't take chance./2

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Three others at gas station said similar in separate conversations. /3

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Did these ppl overinterpret what they were told out of own fears or was threat explicit? Hard to say, but telling either way. /4

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

A friend in srifa s lebanon (Hezb heartland): pro Assad Syrian workers there skipped vote to work, were confident they cd go back to syria/5

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

But another friend in beirut said her Syrian manicurists believed in the threats and felt they had to go vote /6

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Some voters said they preregistered to vote at a center run by Amal, Lebanese party allied w Hezbollah & Syria govt.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Syrians lining up to vote at embassy near Beirut. Lines started 5:30 am. Photo by @hwaidasaad pic.twitter.com/6h1B7QdAbi

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Putting ballots in boxes in early elections for Syrians in Lebanon. 4 boxes squeezed together in this room for >1m pic.twitter.com/sXpSdjws2H

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Anne relays the account of a Syrian who was jailed for 3 months for having delivered humanitarian aid, who explained to her why he wouldn’t vote:

He had the option since he is here legally. But he said this is not a matter of competing political views, "we are dealing with a killer."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Said he wouldnt vote for other 2 candidates – "how do you say clown in English?" He wd vote for a party w/platform not random individuals.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

He called it a "very painful" day for Syrians. Recalled voting for Assad in 2007, felt "in big prison, you cannot say no."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Said Assad voters must be afraid, ignorant or think their choice is betw Assad and ISIS. "They are simple people. I can be against both."

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Said he doesn't expect post elex reform. Iran won't allow, it would give their own people too many ideas.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

@ABarnardNYT @DamascusBureau #Syrians in #Lebanon flock to cast votes at Syrian embassy. pic.twitter.com/Vp4rhrRdgT

— Samar Fares (@txtwxe) May 28, 2014

@ABarnardNYT @DamascusBureau @DavidKenner Syria is currently holding a more successful election in Lebanon than Lebanon is in Lebanon.

— Samar Fares (@txtwxe) May 28, 2014

Lebanese annoyed with Syrian election traffic jams, asking why they didn't do this on a weekend.

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

#Syria ambassador in #Lebanon says embassy will remain open past midnight for voting due to "staggering" numbers of those wanting to do so

— Sam Dagher (@samdagher) May 28, 2014

@nytimesworld @ABarnardNYT The election of exclusion: Christians & expats are excluded from running, refugees excluded from voting.

— Syria Report (@SyriaReport) May 28, 2014

Worth noting: Leb authorities recently barred any political displays by Syrians here, to prevent clashes/problems ahead of elections. /1

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

but all along Baabda hwy today, political displays for Assad. None for other approved candidates, let alone other oppo/alternate Syr flag /2

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Leaving the crush around the ballot boxes, one older Syrian man said: "All this is not necessary. It is already done. "(he didn't explain)

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Syrian govt not v electronic. I wonder, as do some anti-gov Syrians, if govt can really efficiently list voters at border & bar nonvoters/1

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

That said, if mere rumors & fears enough to convince people they have to vote or face consequences, gov maybe happy. its hands clean /2

— Anne Barnard (@ABarnardNYT) May 28, 2014

Moment of Syrians residing in the Syrian embassy in #Amman, #Jordan. #SyrianElection #Sawa #Syria. |28.05.2014| pic.twitter.com/Pfonp1XPe6

— Bashar Isham AlAssad (@Isham_AlAssad) May 28, 2014

@ABarnardNYT @olireports In fact lots of the people I met couldn't remember the names of the other candidates

— Ruth Sherlock (@Rsherlock) May 28, 2014

Think it funny to see photos of one candidate at a polling station?

There is almost as much military as there are voters, all in one hot messy scrum around #syria embassy. With #bashar posters on top

— Ruth Sherlock (@Rsherlock) May 28, 2014

Staff and volunteers wear pro-#Assad clothes at polling booth in Beirut. #Syria election. pic.twitter.com/fMomnDH0i5

— Oliver Holmes (@olireports) May 28, 2014

#Syria election ballots. #Assad bit has been ripped off. Everyone I met said they voted for Assad. pic.twitter.com/Xz4nds2Dpn

— Oliver Holmes (@olireports) May 28, 2014

Wow. RT @prashantrao: AFP barred from filming voting at Syrian embassy in Baghdad. Embassy staff said France's policy is 'against Syria'.

— Liz Sly (@LizSly) May 28, 2014

Connoisseurs of Syrian presidential elections are arguing that the introduction of candidates has ruined the format's traditional minimalism

— Karl Sharro (@KarlreMarks) May 28, 2014

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Syria: The West Should Stop Raising False Expectations – By Nikolaos van Dam

Syria Comment - 화, 2014-05-20 00:18

Syria: The West Should Stop Raising False Expectations
By Nikolaos van Dam*
Delivered at the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin, 19 May 2014
Discussion series “Understanding Syria”. Discussion 3: German and European policy towards Syria: “Look the other way and wait as a strategy?

In my view there are two main ways of ending the conflict in Syria:

1. Further negotiations between the regime and the predominantly secular opposition groups. (Although I am aware that negotiations with the al-Asad regime may not yield much in the end, I do believe negotiations should be attempted more seriously than they have been so far in a proper effort to prevent further bloodshed).

2. To continue the present internal war until one side can claim victory.
For the secular opposition groups to win militarily, they need to be properly armed, but the West does not provide them with enough military support to achieve this. Al-Asad’s chances of winning the war have increased and Islamic extremist forces are now overpowering the predominantly secular opposition forces. The worse the situation becomes, the more the al-Asad regime starts to be seen as an option to be preferred over the radical Islamic state that the Islamist forces want to establish. If al-Asad does win this war, however, it will not be the end of this drama. For sooner or later there will be a reckoning against the al-Asad regime and its crimes against humanity. Therefore, negotiations are the better option, both for him and the opposition.

The Western approach to the Syrian uprising has from the very beginning been dominated by an overdose of wishful thinking, because precedence was given to supposedly democratic and moralistic ideals over realpolitik. Many Western politicians based their positions on their day-to-day domestic political reflexes, rather than on the long-term vision and result-oriented pragmatism that is needed to work towards genuinely helping to solve the conflict. Most Western politicians became fixated on the idea that the conflict could only be resolved if al-Asad was removed from power. They had clear thoughts about what they did not want, but no realistic ideas of what they wanted in al-Asad’s place. Yes, they wanted a democracy, but a violent deposal of al-Asad could not realistically have been expected to result in such a desired peaceful democracy.

Al-Asad never had any intention to leave. On the contrary, he intends to overcome the revolution and win the battle for Syria, whatever the costs. And the higher the costs, the more there is a will to continue the struggle, if only to prevent all the victims from having died in vain. It appears to be all or nothing for both al-Asad’s regime and the opposition movements; at least for the time being, as long as there is no war fatigue.

We should not expect any mercy in the way al-Asad’s regime deals with its opponents: there will be no pardon for the massive armed revolutionary opposition groups that are trying to topple the regime. It is to kill or be killed. A compromise has, as of yet, not really come in sight because a real compromise between the opposition and the regime, with real power sharing and substantial political reforms could be the prelude to the fall of the Ba’th regime later on.

If the regime were to be toppled, its leaders can expect certain execution, and the key figures of the al-Asad regime which have been recruited from the Alawi community can expect to be in severe danger, just like the Alawi community itself, even though this community contains many opponents to the Alawi dominated Ba’th regime. It would be naive to expect President al-Asad to sign his own death warrant.

By branding the rule of President al-Asad as illegitimate, Western countries may have been morally just, but they thereby prematurely cut off any opportunity they had to play a constructive role in helping find a political solution to the crisis. What should have priority: being morally correct or helping find a solution?

Many Western countries considered it politically inappropriate to continue to directly communicate with the al-Asad regime, since they did not want to be seen as condoning its methods. They did not want to be seen as being lenient or compromising their morality in any way with al-Asad’s forces, who already had the blood of hundreds of lives on their hands during the early stages of the revolution in 2011.

Three years after the beginning of the revolution, however, once it became apparent that the regime was much stronger than anticipated, and more than 125.000 dead had fallen, Western countries conceded that they needed to return to the idea of political dialogue, by helping organize the Geneva II conference in 2014. Iran was not allowed to participate in Geneva II, although it might have played a constructive role in trying to convince the Syrian regime to change its position.

In general, as the examples of excluding the PLO, Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran from serious negotiations in other conflict situations have shown, it is a grave mistake to exclude main players in a conflict from dialogue aimed at solving it. Such exclusion achieves nothing, and only contributes to postponing a solution and allowing further bloodshed.

Imposing sanctions in the first year of the revolution with the aim of hitting the hard core of the regime, whilst simultaneously wanting to spare the population from its negative effects, turned out to be illusionary, as could have been predicted on the basis of earlier experiences with boycotts and sanctions elsewhere (e.g. in Iraq). The wishful thinkers hoped that al-Asad would step down once enough pressure had been exercised by the countries condemning him, but dictators do not follow the rules of democratic accountability and decency. Additionally, sanctions that are not accompanied by dialogue or communication generally fail to achieve their intended aim.

Most Western countries closed their embassies in Damascus, thereby further cutting off any opportunities they may have had to engage with the regime, and to maintain a good understanding of internal Syrian developments. The closing of these embassies was meant to send a message of strongest condemnation to al-Asad from the European community, but the symbolism was probably wasted on the Syrian President, who is unlikely to have lost any sleep over the withdrawal of the Western community.

I do not want to argue that if Western efforts for dialogue with the Syrian regime had been taken up much more seriously at an early stage, there would have been any guarantee of success, but it should at the very least have been attempted. At an earlier stage, when much less blood had been shed, compromise would have been much less difficult to reach than it is now.

In its seemingly unwavering conviction that the opposition would be preferable to al-Asad, it was also overlooked that the al-Asad regime is supported by a substantial part of the Syrian population, perhaps some 30 per cent or more, including part of the Arabic speaking minorities (like the Alawis, Christians and Druze). This support should not be interpreted as the existence of real sympathy for the regime, but rather as the prevalent feeling among many that an alternative regime could be even worse. Many Syrians for the time being prefer to preserve their livelihoods under the existing dictatorship rather than having their livelihoods, their shops and spare sources of income and belongings destroyed as a result of the internal war, let alone having themselves and their families be killed. Many are just as, if not more, afraid of what the opposition could bring as they are of the regime’s way of ruling before.

Does the West still have options to help solve the conflict?

- Western military intervention with “boots on the ground” seems to be out of the question. There is no political appetite for it. When the Syrian regime used chemical weapons in Summer 2013, thereby crossing president Obama’s so-called “red lines”, neither the US nor the UK reacted militarily although it had been suggested they would. This seriously undermined Western credibility and demonstrated that their moral threats had no teeth.

- The West’s declared aim to arm the opposition, thereby strengthening their chances of winning the war, seems to have been restricted mainly to non-lethal weapons. It is, however, impossible to win a war with non-lethal weapons. When the EU arms embargo against Syria had been lifted at the insistence of the UK and France in 2013, there was – contrary to expectation – no real change as far as arms deliveries to the opposition were concerned. It turned out that there was no political will to really arm any part of the opposition, even the predominantly secular side. Questions were raised around which of the many opposition groups should be armed and with what aim, as the West obviously wanted to avoid an Islamic extremist dictatorship at all costs. But was there any guarantee that arms provided to others would not end up in their hands? What the West clearly wants to see is a moderate democratic secular pluralist successor regime, but is such a regime a serious possibility? I don’t think it is a realistic prospect; at least not in the foreseeable future.

- The rationale behind delivering arms might also be to provide a counterweight to the regime, strong enough to help force a negotiated settlement. For that to happen, both sides should be convinced that this would be the best, or least bad option. The question remains, however, whether the party that thinks it can win the battle is prepared to negotiate, except perhaps for tactical reasons. Western politicians may continue to pay lip service to the secular opposition, but as long as they do not provide them with the necessary means to win the battle, their moral support has hardly any value. While clearing their political conscience by expressing support for the opposition, they are, in reality, unintentionally helping al-Asad move towards victory.

- In order to play a role in helping achieve a solution, Western contacts need to be maintained with both sides, not just with the opposition. Syrian National Coalition offices could for instance be welcomed in European capitals, as was recently done in the US. It should be clear, however, that such a move would presently be not much more than moral support. At the same time, direct contacts with the Syrian regime should be continued or reestablished.

- Various EU-leaders have on several occasions called for the imposition of no-fly zones in Syria to protect the opposition and population from air-based regime attacks, but nothing has come of this. This may partly be due to the fact that imposing a no-fly zone implies direct war with the Syrian regime.

-The setting up of humanitarian corridors to help the population gain access to food aid has turned out to be unsuccessful as well. Although the relevant Security Council resolution was passed in February 2014, this has so far been no more than a success on paper.

- Most actions by the West have been reactive, with no clearly defined plan or aim for the future beyond removing President al-Asad and his regime from power. The absence of this type of analysis is surprising, particularly given the fact that a future regime could, for example if it were to be a radical Islamist dictatorship, turn out to be worse than the current regime.

- Most Western policies have been no more than declaratory, with few tangible positive results on the ground for the opposition. Supposedly, the good intentions that were widely expressed, were generally not followed up by concrete actions, because the Western countries had their hands tied politically.

A key question that has run throughout debates around the Syrian crisis has been: do we want justice? The answer is, yes, of course, but at which cost? It is easy to say that president al-Asad should be tried for crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. So he should. But does that help us in finding a solution? I would say it does not. Let us make no illusions. The idea that Al-Asad would ever be able to leave Syria alive for such a court case, is extremely unrealistic.

Calling for justice is good in itself, as is the documenting of all the war crimes that have been committed. This has to be done, of course, but not over and above efforts to proactively work towards finding a solution and preventing the further bloodshed that will undoubtedly continue if no serious negotiations are facilitated among Syria’s various clashing factions. The call for justice needs to be a part of wider efforts to create peace, focusing on Syria moving forward, rather than merely focusing on the punishment of those that are guilty for the crimes against the Syrian people committed in the recent past. A solution must be found before justice can be done. It cannot be the other way around.

The West should stop raising false expectations, as it has so often done in the past, and adopt an attitude of result-oriented pragmatism in an effort to really help solve the conflict.

* Nikolaos van Dam is the author of The Struggle for Political Power in Syria and former ambassador of the Netherlands to Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Germany and Indonesia.

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Did the Killing of Abu Bassir Lead to the First Lattakia Offensive?

Syria Comment - 월, 2014-04-28 06:18

by Matthew Barber

Make sure to view this amazing video published by Vice News, entitled “Wolves of the Valley.” The video contains daring reporting by Aris Roussinos (@arisroussinos) who entered Idlib to bring us an interesting picture of the front-line in the conflict between ISIS and SRF fighters.

Vice’s posting of the video is here.

Roussinos also has an article about the situation, published yesterday, here.

In the video, one of the leading SRF fighters gives “a message” to Muslims in the West emphasizing that they do not want new fighters to join them in Syria. He says they have enough men and don’t need more. They do discuss their need for weapons, however, and the video gives an interesting look at equipment and training materials provided to the fighters by the U.S. One of the men describes participating in a weapons training program in Turkey and Qatar. After completing the training, the men return to Syria and receive shipments of weapons. Only those who participate in the training receive weapons, the fighter claims, and he says that the weapons are for “fighting Da’ash” rather that for fighting the regime.

The tactics of ISIS are renounced as un-Islamic by the SRF fighter speaking to Roussinos. He attacks such practices as decapitation and extracting jizya from Christians.

Along with this effort to self-market as “moderate” comes the practice of denigrating ISIS (who, as everyone knows, represents the very antithesis of “moderate”), and amusingly, the commander does denigrate them… as Shiites “who have nothing to do with Islam.” There’s something inherently ironic about leveling the accusation of “Shiism” against al-Qaida groups: first, no one has targeted Shiites with more violence than al-Qaida, and second, one of the defining features of al-Qaida’s immoral character is the intolerance that typifies their ideology. The problem isn’t that they’re “this” or “that,” but that they’re willing to kill those who are “this” or “that.” So judging them because they are “Shiites”—beyond the categorical inaccuracy—seems to betray the fact that even the rebel enemies of ISIS are more influenced than they’d like to admit by the intolerant outlook of al-Qaida itself.

At one point in the film, Roussinos visits a number of prisoners being held by the SRF, among whom are captured ISIS members. They require the men to view a video of a recent mass execution of civilians performed by ISIS and then ask the prisoners if this behavior is Islamic. One of the prisoners in this scene can be heard responding to the accusations of his captors in another video that was posted online a little over a month ago, after his capture:

In this video, the fighters are arguing about the first Lattakia offensive that occurred last August, because the events leading up to it were partly what led to the beginning of the war between ISIS and other rebels groups. Though the Syria National Coalition tried to take credit when the offensive began, calling it part of the Syrian Revolution, it soon became clear that it was masterminded by the al-Qaida franchises. FSA participants were the followers, only joining up after the Islamists spearheaded the campaign. (Here is a video of Salim Idriss visiting the front as a gesture of participation.)

In the video, they argue over who lost more fighters, then the SRF commander says to the captured ISIS fighter: “Why did [ISIS] choose that time to invade? You know why? Because Abu Ayman al-Iraqi was suppose to be presented to a shari’a court for killing Abu Bassir, and he asked for 3 days after which ‘under shari’a I will surrender myself.’ So he started this battle to divert attention and people lost martyrs; we lost 230 martyrs in this failed battle you’re talking about and we suffered 300 injuries and everybody had to focus on themselves.” The ISIS fighter then says he admits that Abu Ayman al-Iraqi killed Abu Bassir without cause, and also that he doesn’t understand why they killed Abu Khaled al-Suri.

What we see here is that the SRF fighters blame ISIS for starting a battle that FSA fighters felt obligated to join, but which ultimately failed and resulted in heavy losses. They are also accusing ISIS of starting the first Lattakia offensive as a distraction to evade the question of justice following their killing of Abu Bassir, an FSA field commander.




Al-Qaeda Is Dead, Long Live Al-Qaeda by Jean-Pierre Filiu

Since the May 2011 death of Osama bin Laden, his al-Qaeda group—which is now led by bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri—typically has been seen as a complex of overlapping “franchises” that together make up the core of a global jihadi movement.

But this is no longer true. The former Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda has now superseded bin Laden’s network to become the more important driving force behind the global jihad in its current guise as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL. The key to understanding current jihadi dynamics is not which group Zawahiri is prepared to bless or banish but which forces tolerate or fight the ISIL.

It is time to forget about Zawahiri, because it is now the ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who is the most important inspiration for global jihad. …

… The UN estimates the number of foreign fighters in Syria at a minimum of 7,000. Not all of them join the ISIL, but its recruiters are roaming the Turkish borders to catch inexperienced volunteers and use them as cannon fodder for their global propaganda and suicide attacks. Syria is far more accessible than any jihadi battlefield in the past, and the ISIL is now bracing for a sustained global campaign from the core of the Middle East.

The foreign recruits will not significantly enhance the ISIL’s fighting force in the current battles in Syria. Instead, they are basically a trump card to magnify the international outreach of Baghdadi’s networks—first in the jihadi diaspora and later as potential operatives in their home countries. The Sinai-based jihadi faction known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, which is presently the most active jihadi group in Egypt, has already endorsed the ISIL, and many others are also tempted to switch publicly their allegiance from Zawahiri to Baghdadi. The clock is ticking—and it is no longer only about Syria.

Despair of the Syrian beggar boy – Ruth Sherlock

Before Iraq election, Shi’ite militias unleashed in war on Sunni insurgents

… “There were men in civilian clothes on motorcycles shouting ‘Ali is on your side’,” one man said, referring to a key figure in Shi’ite tradition. “People started fleeing their homes, leaving behind the elders and young men and those who refused to leave. The militias then stormed the houses. They pulled out the young men and summarily executed them.” …

What Would the Fall of Homs Mean? – Aron Lund

Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi gives an interesting lecture on the various jihadi factions of Syria, their origins and conflicts, here

If Assad Wins War, Challenge From His Own Sect May Follow – Anne Barnard

FSA strikes jihadist-held stronghold

Syrian rebels launched their biggest offensive yesterday against thousands of jihadists in the north who have used terrorist tactics and imposed strict Islamic rules on minorities.

About 1,500 members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) were involved in the push towards the city of Raqqa, which is controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Isis), according to an opposition spokesman. …

Massive explosion in Aleppo today, here; Zahran Aloush/IF take credit for the explosion, here.

Kuwait, a U.S. ally on Syria, is also the leading funder of extremist rebels – WP

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Abdullah ibn Zubayr Battalions of Deir az-Zor Reject Fighting ISIS

Syria Comment - 토, 2014-04-26 05:46

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Since the outbreak of the wider infighting between the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and other rebel groups, some factions have emerged with a definitive anti-fitna stance, insisting on neutrality. The latest case is the Abdullah ibn Zubayr Battalions of Deir az-Zor province, which is instead directing efforts to fighting regime forces in Deir az-Zor city. From a strategic perspective, this approach is offensive: the Jabhat al-Nusra et al. offensive on ISIS in al-Markadah and the ISIS incursions into Deir az-Zor province have so far been little more than a futile waste of manpower and weapons, as the overall stalemate shows. Below is my preliminary translation of their statement.

New Abdullah ibn Zubayr Battalions statement rejecting infighting

“On the principle of self-distancing, and the lack of spilling Muslims’ blood in intervening in the ongoing war between Islamic factions: this war that has eaten up the everything and everybody, this war that has diverted the revolution from its true goal and has offered a service to the regime it dreamed of, allowing it to attempt to advance here and there at more than one point in Ard al-Rabat [Syria].

Accordingly, the leadership of the Group of Abdullah ibn Zubayr battalions announces the following:

1. No intervention in this war on one side against the other.

2. If any member gets involved in this war, he is considered expelled, and the Group has no link with his behaviour; as for someone from the people of the village (non-military) getting involved, we are not responsible for his behaviour and have no link with him whether near or far.

3. The Group will not allow any side involved to use our land as a battlefield.

Leaders of the battalions:

Ayad al-Malihal
Hassan al-Daba’
Hissan al-Jad’an
Bassam al-Badran
Khalid al-Musharraf
Khalifa al-Tayyas
Raed al-Hammad
Ammar ash-Sha’ar
Salama al-Jabar
Muhammad al-Salah
Huwaidi al-Dabbagh”

Abdullah ibn Zubayr fighters in industrial quarter of Deir az-Zor city

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Muhajireen Battalions in Syria (Part Two)

Syria Comment - 금, 2014-04-25 23:42

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Back in December I profiled a variety of battalions of Sunni foreign fighters (part one). Here are some more to add to the list:

Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi

Logo of Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi

This group, which has existed at least since the summer of last year, is the Libyan division of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), despite false rumours that the battalion had defected to Jabhat al-Nusra. Libya itself has been a big source of muhajireen in both Iraq and Syria over the past decade, so the fact that there is a battalion devoted to recruiting Libyan fighters should come as no surprise. The existence of Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi as a front group for ISIS perhaps reflects a wider pro-ISIS trend across central North Africa with the Ansar ash-Shari’a movements in Tunisia and Libya.

In the former country, Ansar ash-Shari’a takes an official pro-ISIS line that dates back to at least the summer of last year (likely explaining the disproportionate number of Tunisian fighters in ISIS’ ranks). In the video linked to, Ansar ash-Shari’a in Tunisia’s official spokesman hails ISIS for making “the Jews, Rafidites [Shi'a] and Nasara [Christians] cry” in addition to freeing Muslim brothers from their prisons. In a document dated to 26th June 2013 and written by Sheikh Abu Ja’afar al-Hatab, a member of the organization’s Shari’a committee, it is argued that “the bay’ah [pledge of allegiance] of Jabhat al-Nusra is false in every aspect, so whoever pledges bay’ah to Jabhat al-Nusra, his bay’ah is corrupt, and there is no bay’ah to him or on him, and the members of Jabhat al-Nusra must repent to God and switch their bay’ah to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.”

Despite the outbreak of wider infighting between ISIS and other rebel groups since January, there is no sign of a distancing on the part of Ansar ash-Shari’a Tunisia from ISIS.

“Support from Kairoun for the Islamic State: remaining and expanding”: This placard from Kairoun- a known area of Ansar ash-Shari’a Tunisia activity- replicates ISIS slogans baqiya wa tatamaddad

An ISIS fighter in Syria reciprocates Ansar ash-Shari’a Tunisia’s support for ISIS: “Support for Ansar ash-Shari’a Tunisia from the soldiers of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.” Image released in late February via Ansar ash-Shari’a Tunisia social media.

Tunisians feature disproportionately in ISIS’ ranks in both Iraq and Syria. Abu al-Dera’ the Tunisian: an ISIS fighter who along with Abu Hafs of Misrata led the recent ISIS assault on Imam Kadhim University in Baghdad.

Abu Omar the Tunisian: an ISIS fighter killed in February in Qalamoun, Damascus province.

Below are some photos of Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi.

Members of Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi praying.

Members of Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi pose with the finger of Tawheed.

Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi fighters.

Abu Talha al-Faranjani, who was killed during the initial outbreak of the wider ISIS-rebel infighting in Atarib, Aleppo province.

Abu Aasem al-Tarabulusi (from Tripoli, Libya), also killed in Atarib.

Abu Talha al-Dernawi (as his name suggests, he is from Derna): carried out a suicide operation for ISIS.

Abu Ayoub, killed on 30th March this year in al-Markadah, southern Hasakah province. The locality has been renamed “Maysara” by ISIS amid heavy fighting against Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamic Front and the Authenticity and Development Front.

Abu Muadh al-Misrati (from Misrata)

Abu Yahya al-Libi, said to have been “killed by the Jowlani Front [Jabhat al-Nusra].”

Members of Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi in al-Markadah. Photo taken on 22nd March.

Raw meat to be cooked by Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi

More delicacies courtesy of Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi

Katiba al-Muhajireen

Not to be confused with Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar, which sometimes used the same name, Katiba al-Muhajireen has been primarily based in the Latakia countryside. It was founded in mid-2012 as an independent group (rather than an ISIS front group as I initially thought; though, like the vast majority of muhajireen groups, it shares the ideological program as Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS) by Libyan muhajireen, some of whom come from the Ansar ash-Shari’a movement. The group participated in the Latakia offensive last summer, but in late December formally joined Jabhat al-Nusra for the sake of unity in the ranks of the mujahideen.

Katiba al-Muhajireen statement announcing its joining Jabhat al-Nusra

Katiba al-Muhajireen fighters praying in Jabal Turkoman, Latakia countryside.

Abu al-Faruq the Libyan: a Katiba al-Muhajireen commander killed in Latakia in mid-August last year.

Abu Obeida al-Maghrebi, a Moroccan fighter for Katiba al-Muhajireen fighter killed last summer.

Statement by Katiba al-Muhajireen claiming targeting of Kasab in May with 30 locally-made rockets.

On a more general level, the case of Katiba al-Muhajireen is important in noting that the muhajireen battalions remaining in Latakia have always tended to be closer to Jabhat al-Nusra than ISIS and that has become more so with time. I have already explained this situation with regards to Harakat Sham al-Islam, which still remains an officially independent group. It is also the case with Suqur al-Izz, an officially independent Saudi muhajireen-founded and led group which has had to turn to Jabhat al-Nusra in the face of loss of financial support from private donors in the Gulf (thanks to Chris Looney for corroborating my observation). Indeed, in the ongoing fighting in Latakia, Suqur al-Izz has essentially been subsumed under Jabhat al-Nusra’s wing. It would not be inaccurate to call Suqur al-Izz and Harakat Sham al-Islam al-Qa’ida front-group projects.

Abu Nabhan al-Ansari: a native Syrian fighter for Suqur al-Izz killed at the end of March in the Latakia fighting.

Imam Bukhari Battalion

Logo of the Imam Bukhari Battalion

An officially independent Uzbek-muhajireen battalion dating back to at least autumn of last year, the group’s ideology is similar to that of other foreign fighter groupings: that is, at least aspiring for Bilad ash-Sham to be ruled by Shari’a alone. The Imam Bukhari battalion primarily operates in Aleppo province. It is led by one Sheikh Ismail Bukhari.

Imam Bukhari Battalion fighters in a training camp

Graduating from the Sheikh Muhammad Ali training camp for the Imam Bukhari Battalion

“Assault on the buildings and cleansing them of apostates”- from an Imam Bukhari Battalion video of operations in al-Layrmoun and Zahara, Aleppo province.

“Ash-Sham will only be ruled by God’s law: Imam Bukhari Battalion.” A good summary of the battalion’s ideology.

The post Muhajireen Battalions in Syria (Part Two) appeared first on Syria Comment.

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The Desert Falcons: An Elite Pro-Assad Force

Syria Comment - 수, 2014-04-09 10:34

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

In the ongoing rebel offensive on Latakia, a new force on the regime side has come to light: namely, the Suqur al-Sahara’ (‘Desert Falcons’).

Desert Falcons insignia (left), and an anonymous member of the brigade (right).

The Arabic outlet El-Nashra explains:

‘Among these forces [that have emerged in the Syrian civil war] are the Desert Falcons that are fighting in Kasab and are considered the prong of attack and defence of the region especially at Point 45. They began operating in Homs and especially on the borders with Iraq to cut supply/aid paths between armed men in the two lands.

These forces are considered among the elite of men fighting in Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad, and there are fighting in its ranks members of military expertise, retired officers and members of the army, as well as volunteers from Syrian youth and age groups averaging between 25 and 40 years of age.

The Desert Falcons forces have medium capabilities and arms as well as machine-gun fire, and the army supports it with artillery when necessary, but it specializes in setting up ambushes and carrying out difficult special assignments.

They have already carried out a large number of combat missions on the Jordanian and Iraqi borders, and a group of them are currently participating in the battles in the Kasab area and its surrounding.’

Rather than a merely symbolic presence, the Desert Falcons are a real fighting force and are acknowledged by the Muqawama Suriya as an allied group in the fight to retake Kasab. Below are some more photos including martyrs for the group.

Members of the Desert Falcons with Syrian army soldiers in unspecified location.

Manhal Ahmad Muhammad, a Desert Falcons fighter killed in the ongoing battle to retake Kasab.

Albir Sama’an al-Umuri, a Desert Falcons fighter killed on 2 April 2014 in the Kasab area.

Brigadier General Harun, a Desert Falcons officer killed on 24 June 2013 in al-Quaryatayn, Homs province. Note that this locality is in the desert area of Homs governorate near Sadad, corroborating El-Nashra’s report on the Desert Falcons’ areas of operation.

‘The men of al-Assad: Desert Organization.’


Maher Habib As’ad: another Desert Falcons fighter killed in the battle for Kasab. 

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“Who Was Hilal al-Assad?” By Mohammad D.

Syria Comment - 월, 2014-04-07 07:35

Hilal al-Assad

Who Was Hilal al-Assad? 
By Mohammad D.
For Syria Comment, April 5 2014

By the time Hilal al-Assad reached Zahi Azraq Military Hospital in Latakia on Sunday March 23,2014, he was already dead. Latakians were already in a state of turmoil and anxiety. Grad missiles had been raining down on the city for a week. That night, at 8 pm, two missiles hit the city-center. The first struck al-Sheikhdaher, a bustling area in the old city and the second slammed into the old post office, less than a hundred yards from an entrance to the Sea Port.  Many were killed and injured in this attack. News that Hilal al-Assad had been signed into the Military Hospital spread like wildfire. Everyone knew within hours. The streets of the city emptied.

Death notice for Halal al-Assad

Hilal al-Assad was the commander of al-Difa’ al-Watani in the Coastal Region and a cousin of President Bashar al-Assad.  A  single bullet hit him in the chest. He was in al-Mushrefeh near Kassab north of the city of Latakia, according to parents of an Alawi soldier fighting with him.  This fighter was on his way with his other brother to help lift the siege of pro-Assad groups surrounded in Kassab.  The younger brother of this fighter, was surrounded with his unit in Kassab.  A range of anti-Assad militias, many composed of foreigners, launched a surprise attack called al-Anfal that was followed by a second offensive named Umahat al-Mu’minin.  The attacks were launched near the Turkish border into an area that was poorly defended, by all accounts.  The surprise attack was a total success. Rebel militias conquered Kassab, an Armenian town best known for its beauty, green hills and for being a summer resort. It is also linked to a custom crossing with Turkey and a small village on the Mediterranean called al-Samra.  Today, fighting is raging throughout the region and both sides are calling up reinforcements.  The pro-Assad forces have been able to retake one highpoint, tower 45, but with no major regains since.Hilal al-Assad is the first Assad family member to be killed since Asef Shawkat was killed in a bomb attack on July/18/2012 while attending a high level meeting in Damascus. Syrian official TV announced Hilal’s death, and declared him a martyr, but no public death announcement, known as Na’wa, was printed.  This is unusual. Numerous Facebook pages were created to celebrate and memorialize him and video messages were posted on the al-Difa’ al-Watani web outlets. For them, Hillal al-Assad death in battle is seen as a great honor. But his death also reminded everyone in Latakia that death and danger was at their door, closer than anyone had thought.

Hilal’s full military funeral procession was held on Monday.  His body left the hospital to the music of a marching band and into an army white ambulance.  He was buried in the Alawite Mountains east of Latakia.  Hilal left behind a wife, two sons and three daughters.  Not that much is known about him. Most reports about him are not accurate. The reaction of his infamous, “trouble maker” son Sulayman, who is only seventeen years old, only deepened the fears of Latakians.

Who is Hilal al-Assad

Hilal al-Assad was born in al-Qardaha in 1967.  His father Anwar was the son of Hafez al-Assad’s older brother Ibrahim (some people say that Ibrahim is a half brother from Ali Sulayman’s first wife Sa’ada. He was married to Umm Anwar).  Ibrahim died many years ago and not much is known or written about him, but his wife, Hilal’s grandmother, Umm Anwar was a very strong woman.  She became a household name as a business woman who took advantage of the rising power of her family. As Hafez al-Assad’s power grew so did her’s along with that of her family.  Her son Anwar was not an educated man. Indeed he was reputed to be slow. What is more, he suffered from Albinism.  So, when Hafez al-Assad became a minister of defense in the 1960′s, Anwar became a janitor in a school in al-Qardaha. When Hafez al-Assad became a president in 1971, Anwar became an employee in the Registery (al-Nufus) in al-Qardaha. He remained a resident of Qardaha until his death.

His son Hilal went to elementary, secondary and high school in Qardaha.  He was young when his relatives started consolidating power in Damascus. His relatives in al-Qardaha started a lucrative business in smuggling. From his high school days, Hilal joined local smugglers who brought goods from Lebanon to Syria. Hilal was one of the Original Shabiha; the first wave of smugglers (See my earlier article: “The Original Shabiha“.  He was a few years younger than the most famous: Fawwaz al-Assad.

But, Hilal was different from Fawwaz, who was bombastic and enjoyed making a spectacle of himself. Hilal did not search out the limelight. He preferred to remain in the shadows, driving his big Mercedes between Lebanon and various Syrian cities.  Many say that his grandmother, Umm Anwar, controlled the smuggling ring that Hilal ran with.  In his early days, Hilal hung out in two places: one was an Armenian photography shop and the other was with a Christian barber friend. His car seemed always to be double-parked outside these two haunts. It caused perpetual traffic jams. He rarely hung out with other goons, unlike Fawwaz, who was a goon magnet.

Hilal amassed a fortune from smuggling. But, once Syrian markets were opened in the 1990s, smuggling dried up. Hilal, like Fawwaz and the other original shabiha, who benefited from the trade restrictions of the 1980′s, had to find a new occupation. Some say that Hilal joined the military academy for a bit before enrolling in Latakia’s Tishreen University, where he studied business. Ultimately, he acquired a degree, but I have been told by a friend of his:

He never attended a class and only showed up at the university to sit for exams.  The only challenging part of his formal education was to struggle not to make mistakes copying the answers that he had passed to him.”

Hilal was able to secure a good plum position in one of the most lucrative state industries. In 1998, he was appointed head of Branch 202 in the Mu’assasat al-Iskan al-Askari.  This meant that Hilal run the Latakia branch of a  construction company owned and financed by the defense ministry. It was responsible for housing projects, building dams, and sometimes built roads. al-Iskan al-Askari was established during the rule of Hafez al-Assad and was first headed by Khalil al-Bahlul, who turned it into a construction giant in the Syrian building sector.

Hilal did not have a good reputation at work.  He is accused of holding back the salaries of the employees for months, making a profit on putting it in the newly formed private banks in the area and abroad.  When workers complained about their late wages, they had to face Military Intelligence, which Hilal would summon to deal with them.  At this era, Hilal would still stay out of the limelight for most of the time.  He would spend most of his night playing cards with the same group: a famous Alawite heart doctor and two rich Sunnis: a man from al-Jud family and another from al-Zein family.  Hilal also loved horses.  He collected them and kept them in the stables of the Sports Complex. Some say that these stables were used as Hilal’s private prison.  These allegations are yet to be confirmed, as well many tashbeeh stories about him.

When the Syrian uprising began, the government formed al-Difa’ al-Watani (National Defence Forces) in 2012.  Its head was stationed in Damascus: General Ghassan Nassour.  Hilal al-Assad was put in charge of al-Difa’ al-Watani in Latakia and its countryside.  The first major military action this militia saw was during the famous attack of August 4th 2013, when Sunni groups attacked 11 Alawite villages.  The attack ended, but the military scrimmages continued, especially now with this Anfal attack in the Kassab region. When Hilal died, al-Difa’ al-Watani had grown from being composed of only a few local “popular committees” (Lijan Sha’biyah) into a small-sized army, complet with a few tanks and many pieces of heavy artillery.

Hilal’s Personal Family:

Unknown to many: Hilal married a Sunni.  His wife, Fatima Massoud, is said to be from the Idlib region.  Others say that her father is from Tripoli, Lebanon.  With Fatima, Hilal has two boys, 17 and 9 and three daughters, the oldest is married to a Sunni from Aleppo.  Hilal’s oldest daughter has a baby girl with her husband.

Sulayman is the notorious 17 years old son of Hilal.  He is a trouble maker and stories about him fill the internet.  Some of these stories are true, while others are exaggerations by known anti-Assad agitators, who expound on the bad behavior of members of al-Assad clan.  He is almost always seen with his armed bodyguards, even on the beach, where his favorite pastime was to make hairpin turns with his all-terrain vehicle so that sand would spray those trying to relax at the shore.  Reports of him shooting at people are many, but cannot be confirmed. Sulayman poses frequently with tanks belonging to the al-Difa’ al-Watani. He posts these on his Facebook page.  His reactions after the death of his father added to the troubles of the city.  It increased the level of fear amongst all.  Reports said that Sulayman went on a rampage twice, the first was the day when his father died.  The second was few days later, when he went with some armed men to al-Slaybeh, a traditional Sunni neighborhood in the old city, and destroyed some of the furniture of al-Tabusheh famous cafe as well as that of a few other stores in the neighborhood.  He ran away when the Mukhabarat showed up.  This attack only deepened the sectarian divisions in the city.

Hilal al-Assad also had two brothers: Harun, the head of the Municipality in al-Qardaha, and Ha’el, an officer in the Republican Guards.

The post “Who Was Hilal al-Assad?” By Mohammad D. appeared first on Syria Comment.

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The Latakia Front: An Interview on the Rebel Side

Syria Comment - 월, 2014-04-07 06:25

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi.

The interview I have translated below comes from Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, a division of the Moroccan muhajireen group Harakat Sham al-Islam, which has played an important role in the ongoing rebel offensive on Latakia and whose founder and leader- Abu Ahmad al-Muhajir/Maghrebi [aka Ibrahim bin Shakaran, the ex-Gitmo detainee and 1990s Afghan jihad veteran] was recently killed.

In the infighting between the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham [ISIS] and other factions, Harakat Sham al-Islam officially- as an “independent” group- took an anti-fitna stance, but as one Syrian contact of mine in the group told me, the organization is closer to Jabhat al-Nusra than ISIS, even as all three share the same ideological program of establishing a Khilafa [Caliphate] over the entire world.

Logo of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam division of Harakat Sham al-Islam

Ibrahim bin Shakaran’s dead body.

Izz ad-Din al-Qassam division of Harakat Sham al-Islam on the Mediterranean coastline in Latakia. Photo from 26 March.

The Muqawama Suriya on the rural peripheries of Kasab. Video footage put out on 6 April.

Rebels in Kasab organize evacuation of remaining Armenians to Turkey. Photo via “Islamic Kasab”: a rebel activist group in the town that first claimed rebel recapture today of Burj 45.

As of now, the situation remains such that rebels still control the Armenian town of Kasab as regime forces continue to fight on the peripheries of Kasab, while some rebel activists in Kasab just a few hours ago claimed the recapture of Burj [tower] 45, which was a few days ago retaken by regime forces. Meanwhile, rebels have launched rocket and mortar strikes on Latakia city.

“Many followers are asking about Burj 45. What is the situation there?

- Up to now, the battlelines are witnessing clashes between the mujahideen and Assad’s gangs. We fight them and they us.

Why are martyrs upon martyrs falling every day?

- This is in the hands of God- these battles and wars. Gunfire flies on every side. So it is inevitable that a number of casualties are reaped from us and from them. And we are but the slain of Jannah and they the slain of Hellfire.

Why and how was the amir of Harakat Sham al-Islam martyred?

- The heroic, brave mujahid sheikh Ahmad al-Maghrebi was martyred in the battle for the tower, and all attested to his courage and bravery. For alone he was carrying out the assault and firing with his bullets on all the apostates and reaping a number of dead from them. The sheikh was martyred just as we reckon him with God by the bullets of a criminal sniper after the Sheikh had massacred and wounded them.

Was Harakat Sham al-Islam leading the battle?

- Ahrar ash-Sham held the leadership of the Burj, under their commander, then he was gravely wounded, then leadership was handed over to the Maghrebi commander, so he and his soldiers took up positions on the Burj and fought heroically, with the support of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ansar ash-Sham.

Whom have the mujahideen faced in Burj 45?

- The mujahideen have faced all the National Defense Force, the Assad army, the militias of Hizb ash-Shaytan, the [Abu] Fadl al-Abbas battalions, and Iranian special forces, but also Chechen soldiers*: your brothers saw them on the Burj. Many of the dogs were masquerading in Afghan clothing and were calling out to brothers: ‘Brother, advance, we are brothers’. God fought them.

What has the battle atmosphere been like?

- The battle has been ferocious and difficult by all standards, for your brothers have faced states and professional soldiers and it’s not only Bashar’s soldiery.

Have other factions besides Sham al-Islam participated in the battle?

- Yes, all from Jabhat al-Nusra, Ansar ash-Sham and Sham al-Islam have participated, then supporting factions came eventually.

Have some factions really withdrawn and engaged in betrayal?

- The withdrawals may be betrayal or tactics, and we only think well of our brothers, for the battle was difficult, the bombing very very strong and the land expansive, but it happened that some ‘Iranians’ engaged in infiltration.

Did the sniper fire or the ‘Sahwa forces of ash-Sham’ kill Abu Ahmad al-Maghrebi?

- Abu Ahmad was killed by malicious Iranian sniper-fire, and there was no treachery or betrayal. Whoever says otherwise so his reckoning is with God.

How many of Bashar’s soldiers have been killed? How many from the mujahideen?

- Many of the brothers especially the ansar** for they have told of their pure blood seeing ash-Sham; in the same way we have cherished the muhajireen for many of them especially from Sham al-Islam and Nusra have been martyred. As for Bashar’s dogs, Iran’s and Chechnya’s militias, many of them have been killed, thanks to God.”

Your brother: Abu Zakariya al-Ansari, participating in the Anfal battle.


*- Presumably the mujahid means mercenaries sent by the Russian government to aid the Assad regime. Note also he has forgotten the role of the Muqawama Suriya. While I have yet to see evidence of Iraqi Shi’a or Hezbollah militia participation here, it should be noted that the Muqawama Suriya has met with members of Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas.

Ali Kayali, leader of the Muqawama Suriya, with Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas commanders in Latakia. Photo from January.

**- In the context of jihadi discourse, the reference to ‘ansar’ in these battles normally means native fighters. Thus, Harakat Sham al-Islam is primarily Moroccan muhajireen and was founded by such people but has a small native Syrian component that use ‘Ansari’ in their noms de guerre. This Latakia offensive, like the one last summer, is being spearheaded by foreign fighters. This applies to Ansar ash-Sham too, with their Chechen commander in this battle one Abu Musa ash-Shishani. In the video linked to, he denounces Ali Kayali as a “dog” and accuses him of killing Muslim innocents.


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